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THE IMPERATIVE FOR FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE  
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 
Why Foreign Animal Diseases Matter 
Preparing for and responding to foreign animal diseases (FADs), like highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(HPAI) and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), are critical measures to safeguard our nation’s animal health, 
public health, and food supply. 
 
There are significant potential consequences of an FAD outbreak in the United States. In addition to the 
economic impact, the social and psychological impact on both producers and consumers could be severe. 
The FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom had an estimated impact of between $12–18 billion. Studies 
have estimated a likely national welfare loss between $2.3–69 billion1 for an FMD outbreak in California, 
depending on delay in diagnosing the disease.
2
 
 
Challenges of Responding to an FAD Event 
An FAD outbreak will be challenging for all stakeholders. For example, there will be disruptions to 
interstate commerce and international trade. Response activities are complex, and significant planning and 
preparation must be conducted before an outbreak. Outbreaks can become large and widespread. Large, 
geographically dispersed and diverse teams will need to be assembled rapidly and must react quickly. The 
response effort must have the capability to be rapidly scaled up, involving many times more resources, 
personnel, and countermeasures. As such, responding to an FAD—large or small—may be a very 
complex and difficult effort.  
Lessons Learned from Past FAD Outbreaks 
Past outbreaks both in the United States and in other countries offer important lessons that can be applied 
to preparedness and response efforts. To achieve successful outcomes in future FAD response, it is vital 
to identify, understand, and apply these lessons learned: 
 Provide a unified State-Federal-Tribal-industry planning process that respects local knowledge. 
 Ensure the unified command sets clearly defined and obtainable goals. 
 Have a unified command that acts with speed and certainty to achieve united goals. 
 Employ science-based and risk-management approaches that protect public health and animal 
health, stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy. 
 Ensure guidelines, strategies, and procedures are communicated and understood by responders 
and stakeholders. 
                                                          
1
 Carpenter TE, O’Brien JM, Hagerman AD, & McCarl BA. 2011. “Epidemic and economic impacts of delayed detection of foot-
and-mouth disease: a case study of a simulated outbreak in California.” J Vet Diagn Invest. 23:26-33. 
2
 Estimates based on models may vary: Ekboir (1999) estimated a loss of between $8.5 and $13.5 billion for an FMD outbreak 
in California. Ekboir JM. 1999. “Potential Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in California: the Role and Contribution of Animal 
Health Surveillance and Monitoring Services.” Agricultural Issues Center. University of California, Davis. 
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 Acknowledge that high expectations for timely and successful outcomes require the: 
 Rapid scale-up of resources and trained personnel for veterinary activities and  
countermeasures, and 
 Capability to quickly address competing interests before or during an outbreak. 
 Rapid detection and FAD tracing is essential for the efficient and timely control of  
FAD outbreaks. 
FAD PReP Mission and Goals 
The significant threat and potential consequences of FADs, and the challenges of and lessons learned of 
effective and rapid FAD response have led to the development of the Foreign Animal Disease 
Preparedness and Response Plan, also known as “FAD PReP.” The mission of FAD PReP is to raise 
awareness, expectations, and develop capabilities surrounding FAD preparedness and response. The goal 
of FAD PReP is to integrate, synchronize, and de-conflict preparedness and response capabilities as much 
as possible before an outbreak, by providing goals, guidelines, strategies, and procedures that are clear, 
comprehensive, easily readable, easily updated, and that comply with the National Incident  
Management System. 
 
In the event of an FAD outbreak, the three key response goals are to: (1) detect, control, and contain the 
FAD in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate the FAD using strategies that seek to stabilize 
animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, and protect public health; and (3) provide science- and 
risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected animals and non-
contaminated animal products. Achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, 
States, Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as possible. They will also 
allow the United States to regain FAD-free status without the response effort causing more disruption and 
damage than the disease outbreak itself. 
FAD PReP Documents and Materials 
FAD PReP is not just one, standalone FAD plan. Instead, it is a comprehensive US preparedness and 
response strategy for FAD threats. This strategy is provided and explained in a series of different types of 
integrated documents, as illustrated and described below.  
 
FAD PReP Suite of Documents and Materials 
 
Note: APHIS = Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, NAHEMS = National Animal 
Health Emergency Management System, SOP = standard operating procedures. 
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 Strategic Plans—Concept of Operations  
 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination: This document provides 
an overall concept of operations for FAD preparedness and response for APHIS, explaining the 
framework of existing approaches, systems, and relationships. 
 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies and Activities: This 
document provides significant detail on response strategies and activities that will be conducted 
in an FAD outbreak. 
 National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM) Stakeholder 
Coordination and Collaboration Resource Guide: This guide describes key stakeholders with 
whom NCAHEM collaborates. 
 NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan: This document explains how APHIS 
headquarters will organize in the event of an animal health emergency.  
 NAHEMS Guidelines 
 These documents describe many of the critical preparedness and response activities, and can be 
considered as a competent veterinary authority for responders, planners, and policy-makers. 
 Industry Manuals 
 These manuals describe the complexity of industry to emergency planners and responders and 
provide industry a window into emergency response. 
 Disease Response Plans 
 Response plans are intended to provide disease-specific information about response strategies. 
These documents offer guidance to all stakeholders on capabilities and critical activities that 
would be required to respond to an FAD outbreak. 
 Critical Activity Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)  
 For planners and responders, these SOPs provide details for conducting 23 critical activities 
such as disposal, depopulation, cleaning and disinfection, and biosecurity that are essential to 
effective preparedness and response to an FAD outbreak. These SOPs provide operational 
details that are not discussed in depth in strategy documents or disease-specific response plans. 
 Continuity of Business (commodity specific plans developed by public-private- 
academic partnerships) 
 Secure Egg Supply (SES) Plan: The SES Plan uses proactive risk assessments, surveillance, 
biosecurity, and other requirements to facilitate the market continuity and movement of eggs 
and egg products during an HPAI outbreak. 
 Secure Milk Supply (SMS) Plan: Currently under development, the SMS Plan will help 
facilitate market continuity for milk and milk products during an FMD outbreak. This Plan also 
will employ proactive risk assessments. 
 Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan: Currently under development, the SPS Plan will help facilitate 
market continuity for pork and pork products during an FMD, classical swine fever, swine 
vesicular disease, or African swine fever outbreak. 
 Secure Turkey Supply (STS) Plan: Currently under development, the STS Plan will help 
facilitate market continuity for the turkey sector during an HPAI outbreak. 
 Outbreak Response Tools 
 Case definitions, appraisal and compensation guidelines and formulas, and specific surveillance 
guidance are examples of important outbreak response tools. 
 State/Tribal Planning 
 State and Tribal planning is essential for an effective FAD response. These plans are tailored to 
the particular requirements and environments of the State or Tribal area, taking into account 
animal populations, industry, and population needs. 
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 Industry, Academic, and Extension Planning 
 Industry, academia, and extension stakeholder planning is critical and essential: emergency 
management is not just a Federal or State activity. 
 APHIS Emergency Management 
 APHIS directives and Veterinary Services Memorandums provide critical emergency 
management policy. APHIS Emergency Management documents provide guidance on topics 
ranging from emergency mobilization, to the steps in investigating a potential FAD, to 
protecting personnel from HPAI.  
These documents are available on the FAD PReP collaboration website: https://fadprep.lmi.org. For those 
with access to the APHIS intranet, they are available on the internal APHIS FAD PReP website: 
http://inside.aphis.usda.gov/vs/em/fadprep.shtml.  
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PREFACE 
The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)/National Animal Health 
Emergency Response System (NAHEMS) Guidelines provide the foundation for a coordinated national, 
regional, state and local response in an emergency. As such, they are meant to complement non-Federal 
preparedness activities. These guidelines may be integrated into the preparedness plans of other Federal 
agencies, State and local agencies, Tribal Nations, and additional groups involved in animal health 
emergency management activities. 
This Appendix B: Vaccination for Classical Swine Fever is a supplement to FAD PReP/NAHEMS 
Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, and covers the disease-specific strategies and general 
considerations of vaccination. Both documents are components of APHIS’ FAD PReP/NAHEMS 
Guideline Series, and are designed for use by APHIS Veterinary Services (VS), and other official 
response personnel in the event of an animal health emergency, such as the natural occurrence or 
intentional introduction of a highly contagious foreign animal disease in the United States. 
Appendix B: Vaccination for Classical Swine Fever, together with the Vaccination for Contagious 
Diseases Guidelines, provide guidance for USDA employees, including National Animal Health 
Emergency Response Corps (NAHERC) members, on principles of vaccination for classical swine fever 
for animal health emergency deployments. This Appendix B: Vaccination for Classical Swine Fever 
provides information for Vaccination Group Supervisors and other personnel associated with vaccination 
activities. The general principles discussed in this document are intended to serve as a basis for 
understanding and making sound decisions regarding vaccination in a classical swine fever emergency. 
As always, it is important to evaluate each situation and adjust procedures to the risks present in the 
situation.  
The FAD PReP/NAHEMS Guidelines are designed for use as a preparedness resource rather than as a 
comprehensive response document. For more detailed vaccination information, see plans developed 
specifically for the incident and consult the FAD PReP Standard Operating Procedures (SOP): 16. 
Vaccination. 
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APHIS DOCUMENTS 
Key APHIS documents complement this “Appendix B: Vaccination for Classical Swine Fever, Strategies 
and Considerations” and provide further details when necessary. This document references the following 
APHIS documents: 
 
 APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework documents 
o Roles and Coordination 
o Response Strategies and Activities 
 
These documents are available on the FAD PReP collaboration website at: https://fadprep.lmi.org 
Username and password can be requested. 
 
 
For the full listing of all references, including other APHIS documents, see section 25. References. 
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1. PURPOSE 
This Appendix is intended to provide relevant information for federal and state officials and other 
interested parties who will participate in making decisions related to use of vaccine as an aid to control an 
outbreak of classical swine fever (CSF) in the United States (U.S.). The following topics are presented 
and discussed: 
 Important characteristics of CSF 
 Characteristics of vaccines 
 Strategies for vaccine use 
 Various factors that must be considered when designing an effective vaccination program 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
The United States eradicated the last case of CSF in August 1976 [1]. A possible disease introduction 
continually threatens the U.S. swine herd. This concern has been heightened with the actions on 
September 11, 2001. The intentional release of CSF virus (CSFV) into the U.S. swine herd is a real 
concern. We also have to accept that an unintentional introduction is possible. Employees and owners of 
hog production systems who travel all over the world as well as visitors who arrive from countries with 
endemic CSF could unintentionally expose the pigs they care for or come in contact with. The clinical 
signs associated with CSF resemble many endemic diseases, so diagnosis may be delayed which in turn 
makes control even more difficult. Tens of thousands of pigs are being moved daily in the U.S. 
Conservative industry estimates place over 625,000 swine in trucks on the road every day [2]. During 
transport, any pig exposed to CSFV would have the potential to spread the disease to another location 
before it is diagnosed. Artificial insemination is a technology which has greatly benefitted the U.S. swine 
industry; however, if a boar stud becomes infected with CSFV, infected semen could be distributed 
throughout the country unknowingly [3]. Feral swine continue to thrive in several states in the U.S. If 
CSFV would infect feral swine, then CSF would be even more difficult to eradicate from the U.S. 
Therefore, an appropriate and usable response plan needs to be in place before a diagnosis is confirmed if 
the swine industry is to be able to respond effectively to such an event. 
 
CSF is endemic in many parts of the world. CSF is found in several countries in Asia, Africa, South and 
Central America and in some Caribbean islands [4]. Specifically, according to the OIE World Animal 
Health Information Database, Mexico last reported new cases of CSF in the period of January-July 2009 
with the disease being absent July- December 2010. CSF was reported in Haiti in 2011 and the 
Dominican Republic and Cuba in 2010 (2011 data not available on OIE website for the Dominican 
Republic and Cuba). This disease has been eradicated from the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia, 
and from domestic swine operations in most of western and central Europe. 
 
Outbreaks in countries free of CSF have resulted in CSF infection on multiple farms with significant 
economic losses for swine industries in those countries. In 1994, Germany reported 117 farms infected, 
FAD PReP/NAHEMS Guidelines: Appendix B: Vaccination for Classical Swine Fever (2012)               2 
 
and Belgium reported 48 farms tested positive for CSFV [5]. During the outbreak from 1997-1998, 429 
farms in the Netherlands were infected with an estimated $423 million in losses and $596 million in 
losses for related industries [5]. Terpstra et al. [6] estimated greater losses in the Netherlands totaling over 
$2 billion. Paarlberg et al. [7] calculated potential economic losses during a CSF outbreak in the U.S. 
Eleven million hogs are destroyed in this scenario, with losses ranging from $2.6 billion to $4.1 billion 
when considering the value of destroyed animals, the effect on breeding herd numbers, product demand 
and effect on exports. 
 
Controlling CSF infections in areas that are pig dense has proven to be very challenging. Measures to 
control CSF outbreaks in the Netherlands, England and Belgium did not include CSF vaccination. 
Although the measures of stop animal movement, isolation and stamping-out helped to control the 
outbreak in the Netherlands, it was at a great economic loss [8]. For countries of the European Union 
(EU), utilizing CSF vaccination is prohibited unless the affected country requests and is granted 
permission to carry out emergency vaccination in addition to control measures already underway, 
according to Article 19 of EU Directive 2001/89/EC [9]. For example, beginning in 2006, Romania 
determined that in order to eradicate CSF, vaccination would be beneficial. In order to utilize vaccination, 
they would have to receive approval from the European Commission. The contingency plans including 
the use of CSF vaccine submitted by Romania to the Commission on 9 November 2006 for the control of 
classical swine fever were approved under Directive 2007/19/EC [10]. Emergency vaccination was 
allowed to be used in Romania in order to eradicate CSF.  
 
While stopping the movement of pigs may help to contain the spread of CSF, preventing animals from 
moving can create welfare concerns. With the management practices of the U.S. swine industry, many 
animals remain on a site until a specified weight or age. For example, pigs may be placed in a nursery 
from weaning at about 3 weeks of age until they reach about 50 pounds body weight. At that time, they 
are to be moved into a finishing building. If a stop movement were in place, the animals would continue 
to grow becoming overcrowded. Also, young animals that need to be weaned cannot be transported onto 
that site or building if it has not been emptied. According to Pluimers et al. [8], during the outbreak in the 
Netherlands during 1997-1998, the welfare of the pigs during a stop movement was a concern. As animals 
became overcrowded and pigs began to suffer health problems, authorities implemented a buy-out plan 
and carcasses were destroyed. In 2004, participants in the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
International Conference on the Control of Infectious Animal Diseases by Vaccination in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina concluded that mass slaughter is no longer acceptable as the main technique for disease control 
and eradication, due to ethical, ecological and economic concerns [11]. They recommended that methods 
for disease prevention, control and eradication be reviewed, and advised an increased emphasis  
on vaccination. 
 
When initial control measures such as stamping-out, quarantine, and stop movement do not contain a CSF 
outbreak, the use of vaccine needs to be considered. According to DeHaven [12], “The decision to use, or 
not to use, a vaccine in the face of a foreign animal disease outbreak can be complex and have far-
reaching socio-economic consequences. Incorrect decisions or delays occurring during the actual outbreak 
can be costly.” Several factors to consider include the number of herds affected, how quickly the disease 
is spreading, personnel available to assist in the response effort and the number of feral swine in the area. 
3. OVERVIEW OF CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER (CSF) 
Summary 
Classical swine fever virus (CSFV) is a member of the genus Pestivirus and family Flaviviridae.  
 
The small enveloped, single stranded RNA virus is closely related to the ruminant pestiviruses that cause 
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bovine viral diarrhea and border disease. Only one serotype exists, although variability has been shown. 
 
All species of domestic (Sus scrofa domesticus), feral and wild pigs, including European wild boar (Sus 
scrofa scrofa) and collared peccaries, are thought to be susceptible. Humans and other livestock species 
do not appear to be affected by CSFV. 
 
Virus shedding can begin before the onset of clinical signs, and occurs throughout the course of acute or 
subclinical disease. Chronically or persistently infected pigs can shed virus continuously or intermittently 
for months. 
 
Sows can be infected at any stage of gestation and the virus may cross the placenta and infect the fetuses. 
The outcome of the fetal infection depends on the strain virulence and the time of gestation when the 
infection occurs. Pigs born to sows infected with CSFV during gestation may be stillborn, aborted or 
mummified. Those pigs born alive may be persistently infected. 
 
Persistently infected pigs born alive may appear asymptomatic initially; however, a congenital tremor 
may develop. These piglets may survive past 6 months, rarely up to a year, meanwhile shedding the virus 
and acting as a source of infection for other pigs. 
 
Cerebellar hypoplasia is evident more frequently in pigs born to sows infected prior to 43 days  
of gestation.  
 
Clinical signs may vary depending on the stage of infection and type (acute, subacute, chronic or 
persistent/late onset) and virulence of the strain. Clinical signs with an acute infection of a highly virulent 
strain include a high fever, huddling, weakness, drowsiness, anorexia, conjunctivitis, and constipation 
followed by diarrhea. Clinical signs are generally less severe with the subacute form due to infection with 
lower virulence strains. The chronic form presents with clinical signs similar to the acute form except pigs 
lose weight as severe lesions develop in the ileum and rectum. 
 
Transmission between pigs occurs mainly by the oral or oronasal routes, via direct or indirect contact. 
Virus can be shed in saliva, lacrimal secretions, blood, urine, feces, and semen. Transmission may occur 
through feeding uncooked contaminated garbage containing pork products, or may be spread by genital 
transmission or artificial insemination. The virus can also be transmitted on fomites and by mechanical 
spread. Airborne transmission seems to be possible over short distances; however, the maximum distance 
the virus can spread is unclear.  
 
The incubation period for acute disease can range from 2 to 14 days, depending on the virulence of the 
strain, the route of infection and the dose. 
 
CSFV is easily transmitted due to its ability to survive in the environment and in pork products. CSFV 
survival time in chilled pork is up to 3 months, up to 4 years in frozen pork and pork products, and 17-180 
days in salted or smoked meat. 
3.1 Serotypes and Strains 
Classical swine fever virus (CSFV) is a member of the genus Pestivirus and family Flaviviridae [13]. The 
small enveloped, single stranded RNA virus is closely related to the ruminant pestiviruses that cause 
bovine viral diarrhea and border disease [14]. Only one serotype exists, although variability has been 
shown [15]. The structure of the virus is made up of the Protein C and glycoproteins Erns, E1, and E2 
[16]. CSFV strains can vary considerably in virulence. 
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3.2 Species Affected 
All species of domestic (Sus scrofa domesticus), feral and wild pigs, including European wild boar (Sus 
scrofa scrofa) and collared peccaries, are thought to be susceptible. Humans and other livestock species 
do not appear to be affected by CSF. 
3.3 Pathogenesis 
Infected pigs are the only reservoir of this highly contagious virus. The most common form of CSFV 
transmission in pigs is oronasal [17]. If pigs are intranasally infected with CSF virus, it will replicate 
primarily in the tonsils before spreading to other lymphoid organs [18-20] including regional lymph 
nodes, and then into the peripheral blood, bone marrow and visceral lymph nodes [17]. Blood, oronasal 
and lacrimal secretions, urine, feces, semen and tissues contain infectious virus [3, 21, 22]. Spread of the 
virus within the animal usually occurs in 5-6 days [23]. Virus shedding can begin before the onset of 
clinical signs, and occurs throughout the course of acute or subclinical disease [24]. Chronically or 
persistently infected pigs can shed virus continuously or intermittently for months [22, 25]. 
3.3.1. Persistent Infection (sometimes referred to as the Prenatal Course or ‘late onset CSF’) 
When sows were infected with CSFV on either day 22 or 43 of gestation, pigs born showed a variety of 
clinical signs including tremors [26]. Of those with tremors, 83% of those pigs had cerebellar hypoplasia. 
Several piglets died within a few days of birth. Pigs from sows infected after day 72 of gestation did not 
exhibit severe tremors, although a majority of these piglets were either mummified or stillborn [26]. 
Tremors became less evident as the pigs grew older and continued to shed CSFV. Van Oirschot et al. [27] 
produced different results upon infecting four sows each at 40, 65 and 90 days of gestation with a low 
virulent CSFV. Transplacental transmission did not occur in two of the four sows infected at 40 days 
gestation and two of four sows infected at 90 days gestation. Two different sows infected at 40 days 
gestation gave birth to pigs which all tested positive for virus at birth, and one of four sows infected at 65 
days gestation also gave birth to pigs all of which tested positive at birth [27]. Concerning persistently 
infected animals, Van Oirschot et al. [27] concluded from this experiment that sows that are infected with 
this low virulent strain of CSFV at an earlier stage of gestation will produce a greater number of 
persistently infected pigs. Dahle et al. [28] inoculated sows between 70 and 90 days gestation and 
observed persistently infected pigs born to these sows.  
3.4 Clinical Signs 
For official control purposes, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) defines the incubation 
period for acute infection of CSF as 2-14 days and in cases of chronic infection up to 3 months [29]. Pigs 
infected with CSFV may show a variety of clinical signs depending on the stage and type of infection 
(acute, subacute, chronic or persistently infected) and virulence of the strain. 
3.4.1 Acute Infection 
Clinical signs associated with an acute infection include a high fever, huddling, weakness, drowsiness, 
anorexia, conjunctivitis, and constipation followed by diarrhea [17, 30, 31]. Purple discoloration of the 
skin in the abdomen, inner thighs or ears may be visible, or hemorrhages may be evident. Vomiting bile 
may occur, or respiratory signs may develop. Pigs may show neurologic signs such as incoordination or 
unsteadiness, which may progress to posterior paresis or convulsions in the terminal stages [4, 31]. If 
bloodwork is conducted, the clinician may find severe leukopenia. Pigs in the acute stages of CSF often 
die within 10-20 days after infection [24].  
3.4.2 Subacute Infection 
Moderately virulent strains of CSFV can cause subacute disease in which the clinical signs are less 
severe. However, the fever may persist for two to three weeks. Survival of pigs with subacute classical 
swine fever varies as some survive longer periods; while others die within a month [24].  
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3.4.3 Chronic Infection 
When the immune system cannot eliminate the CSFV, pigs develop the chronic form of the infection. The 
clinical signs are similar to those associated with the acute form; however, pigs lose weight as severe 
lesions develop in the ileum and rectum [31].  
 
For animals infected with a moderately virulent CSF virus, chronic infection may occur [25, 32]. Animals 
that have been chronically infected with CSF do not always demonstrate a clear antibody response 
following a CSF infection. Chronically infected pigs shed CSF virus [33]. While these animals may not 
show clinical signs, they may harbor the virus and shed it. Pigs developing the chronic form may survive 
2-3 months before they die [17]. 
3.4.4 Persistent Infection (sometimes referred to as the Prenatal Course or ‘late onset CSF’) 
Sows can be infected at any stage of gestation, with the virus crossing the placenta and infecting the 
fetuses. The outcome of the infection will depend on the virulence of the strain and the time of gestation 
[31]. If infected in early pregnancy with a strain of moderate or low virulence, pigs may be aborted, 
stillborn, or mummified. Infection of the sow around 50-70 days of gestation may result in persistently 
infected pigs, depending on the strain virulence [31]. While these pigs are born alive, they may develop a 
congenital tremor while others are asymptomatic at birth [27, 31]. Persistently viremic animals may not 
show signs, such as stunted growth, for several months [31, 34]. Some pigs will survive for more than six 
months, rarely surviving past one year, while shedding the virus, potentially spreading the disease [22]. 
 
Differential diagnosis includes African swine fever, salmonellosis, porcine dermatitis and nephropathy 
syndrome, erysipelas, porcine circovirus associated disease, hemolytic disease of the newborn, porcine 
reproductive and respiratory syndrome, pasteurellosis, actinobacillosis, Haemophilus suis infections, 
thrombocytopenic purpura, anticoagulant (e.g. warfarin) poisoning, salt poisoning, pseudorabies, 
parvovirus infections and eperythrozoonosis [4, 31].  
3.5 Transmission 
Classical swine fever is highly contagious. Transmission between pigs occurs by the oral or oronasal 
routes, via direct or indirect contact [17, 31, 35, 36]. Some experts regard direct contact as the most 
important route of CSF transmission [37]. Virus can be shed in saliva, lacrimal secretions, blood, urine, 
feces and semen [3, 21, 27, 38, 39]. CSFV can be spread by genital transmission or artificial insemination 
as boar semen may contain CSFV [3]. In the 1997-98 CSF outbreak in the Netherlands, two AI studs 
became infected. Because the boar studs were allowed to continue shipping semen, they were suspected 
of potentially infecting 21 sow herds [6]. Infected carrier sows may give birth to persistently  
infected pigs. 
 
CSFV may be transmitted when uncooked contaminated garbage containing pork products is fed to pigs 
[36]. Because pork products may be smuggled into the U.S. from countries with endemic CSF, this would 
represent a possible long-distance route of transmission. Garbage feeding has been suspected in other 
countries as a means of CSF introduction. In Bulgaria, non-vaccinated pigs fed uncooked table scraps 
tested positive for CSFV in March 2000 [40]. According to Kleiboeker [41], a hiker feeding part of a ham 
sandwich to a sow herd was suspected to introduce the CSF virus in the United Kingdom in 2000. 
Transmission occurred in these cases due to the survival period of CSFV in pork products. CSFV survival 
time in chilled pork is up to 3 months [42-44], up to 4 years in frozen pork and pork products [45] and 17-
180 days in salted or smoked meat [4, 43, 45-47]. 
 
Fomites and mechanical spread involving insects, birds, pets and other wild or domesticated animals can 
also play a role in virus transmission. Dorset et al. [48] reported stableflies and houseflies can transmit 
CSFV from sick pigs to healthy pigs. While they have been suspected, it is still unclear if birds play a role 
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in transmission [37]. The role cats, dogs, and rodents have played in spread of CSFV has been questioned. 
Research by Dewulf et al. [49] provided evidence that cats, dogs and rats do not serve as a reservoir of 
CSFV; although transmission may still be possible. Feral swine roam in many states throughout the U.S. 
If CSFV infects feral swine, they would threaten the health of the U.S. domestic herd. In Germany, direct 
or indirect contact with CSF infected wild boar was found to be the cause of CSFV transmission to 
domestic swine [36].  
 
While Dewulf et al. [50] demonstrated airborne transmission is possible under experimental conditions, 
the maximum distance the virus can spread is unclear. While aerosol transmission was documented only 
within a radius of 250 meters in some studies, transmission did occur up to 1 km in another [37]. 
 
Transportation vehicles pose a threat in transmitting CSFV when not properly cleaned and disinfected. 
Although it has not been proven, transportation vehicles are thought to have introduced CSFV into the 
Netherlands during the 1997/1998 CSFV outbreak [51]. Swine transport trucks are suspected to have 
come in contact with CSF virus in Germany and carried it back to the farm where the primary outbreak 
later occurred in the Netherlands. The very cold weather made properly cleaning and disinfecting the 
transport vehicles difficult.  
 
Estimates of its survival in pens and on fomites under field conditions vary. Weesendorp et al. [52] 
utilized the highly virulent strain Brescia and the moderately virulent strain Paderborn to investigate 
CSFV survival in urine and feces. In their model, virus was no longer detectable in the feces after 42 days 
when pigs were infected with the Paderborn strain and after 64 days when pigs were infected with the 
more virulent Brescia strain. However, when testing the urine, neither strain of the virus could be detected 
after 18 days post infection [52]. While initial concentrations and strain of the virus in feces will affect the 
survival time, using this model, at 20
o
C, the virus was inactivated in feces within 3 (Paderborn strain) to 5 
days (Brescia strain) and 15-20 hours at 30
o
C [52]. The incubation period can range from 2 to 14 days, 
depending on the virulence of the strain, the route of infection and the dose [4]. The OIE listed incubation 
period ranges from 2 to 14 days [29]; Pasick reports 3 to 4 days may be typical [15]. Under field 
conditions, the disease may not be diagnosed in a herd for 2 to 4 weeks as the clinical signs resemble 
domestic diseases. In the Netherlands, on January 15, 1997, a practitioner observed atypical disease 
clinical signs in finishing pigs [51]. He suspected pneumonia and prescribed antibiotics. When the pigs 
did not respond to treatment, the practitioner suspecting Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome 
(PRRS), submitted two pigs to the diagnostic laboratory on January 21. The laboratory diagnosed CSF on 
February 4, 1997, over 2 weeks after the pigs began to show clinical signs. 
3.5.1 Vaccination and Virus Transmission  
Effective vaccination can decrease transmission between animals by 1) decreasing the susceptibility of 
animals to infection, and 2) reducing virus shedding, if a vaccinated animal becomes infected. 
4. DETECTION OF INFECTED ANIMALS 
Summary 
Diagnosing CSF based on clinical signs alone is almost impossible. 
 
Several OIE-approved tests are available with the preferred sample of whole blood or serum for live 
animals and tonsil, ileum or additional acceptable tissues if the pig is necropsied.  
 
The CSF virus or viral antigens are detected by direct immunofluorescence (FAT or FATST test), 
enzyme–linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs), virus isolation, reverse transcription- PCR (RT-PCR) 
and real time RT-PCR (qRT-PCR). 
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The fluorescent antibody test (FAT) utilizes the tonsil, spleen, kidney, lymph nodes or distal portions of 
the ileum to detect CSV antigen. The tonsil is the preferred sample 2 to 15 days post infection whereas the 
ileum will provide more accurate test results for subacute and chronic cases. Vaccine administration and 
infection with ruminant pestiviruses may affect FAT test results in some cases. 
 
When ruminant pestiviruses are suspected, a panel of monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) can be used to 
differentiate CSF from ruminant pestiviruses. 
 
The antigen-capture ELISA is a good test to use on live animals in herds suspected of CSF infection. 
 
While virus isolation is a more sensitive test, it takes longer to complete. When using the PK-15 or SK-6 
cell line, cultures are examined by FAT after 24 to 72 hours, or in 4- to 5-day-old cultures when utilizing 
immunoperoxidase staining. Samples for virus isolation should be refrigerated but not frozen; they should 
be kept cold during shipment to the laboratory. 
 
Reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) is especially useful in preclinical diagnosis of 
CSF due to its high sensitivity. Blood samples from live pigs or tissues samples, including tonsil, spleen, 
ileum and lymph node, collected during necropsy can be utilized with results in 48 hours. 
 
Serology is used for diagnosis and surveillance. Antibodies develop after 2 to 3 weeks, and persist 
lifelong. The most commonly used OIE-approved tests are virus neutralization tests, which include the 
neutralizing peroxidase-linked assay and the fluorescent antibody virus neutralization test, and  
various ELISAs.  
 
Performing virus neutralization tests or ELISAs that use monoclonal antibodies provides for 
differentiation of CSFV infections from ruminant pestiviruses. 
 
Several countries and the European Union accept the use of RT-PCR in suspect CSF cases as it is 
sensitive and can be performed rapidly. However, as false positive results may occur, another test such as 
virus isolation should be performed when an initial CSF positive may signal a CSF outbreak. 
 
Diagnosing CSF based on clinical signs alone is almost impossible. The clinical presentation of CSF is 
similar to many U.S. endemic diseases including salmonellosis, porcine reproductive and respiratory 
syndrome, porcine circovirus associated disease, erysipelas, pasteurellosis, actinobacillosis, and 
Haemophilus parasuis. African swine fever, which is a foreign animal disease, produces clinical signs 
similar to those of CSF also. Therefore, diagnostics need to be performed to confirm CSF. Several OIE-
approved tests are available with the preferred sample of whole blood or serum for live animals and 
tonsil, ileum or additional acceptable tissues if the pig is necropsied [34].  
 
An overview of CSF diagnostic methods, as described in by the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and 
Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 2009 [34], is given below. 
4.1 Detecting Acutely Infected Animals by Identifying the CSF Virus 
Classical swine fever can be diagnosed by detecting the virus, its antigens or nucleic acids in whole blood 
or tissue samples. Viral antigens are detected by direct immunofluorescence (FAT) or enzyme–linked 
immunosorbent assays (ELISAs). If isolating the virus, the pig kidney (PK-15) cell line may be used. 
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is also commonly performed [34]. 
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4.1.1 Fluorescent Antibody Test 
CSFV antigen can be detected using the fluorescent antibody test (FAT). This rapid test utilizes frozen 
sections of tonsils, spleen, kidney, lymph nodes or distal portions of the ileum [34]. Detecting CSF virus 
in the tonsil is more likely 2 to 15 days post infection when animals are showing clinical signs of CSF 
compared to animals that have been infected for a longer period of time [21, 53]. Testing the ileum will 
provide more accurate test results for subacute and chronic cases [17]. If a FAT result is negative and 
CSF is still suspected, virus isolation in cell culture ((e.g. pig kidney [PK-15]) or another cell line of pig 
origin) should be attempted [34].  
 
Vaccine administration and infection with ruminant pestiviruses may affect FAT results in some cases. 
Administration of the MLV vaccine may cause pigs to test positive on the FAT for 2 weeks following 
vaccination [34, 54, 55]. Ruminant pestiviruses can also interfere with CSFV testing causing false-
positive FAT reactions. Pigs infected with ruminant pestiviruses from congenital infections can have the 
same clinical signs and lesions as pigs with chronic CSF [56-58]. To differentiate infections from CSFV 
versus ruminant pestiviruses, animals can be tested for neutralizing antibodies to the virus [34]. 
4.1.2 Immunoperoxidase Staining 
As stated previously, ruminant pestiviruses can produce a false-positive FAT test. When ruminant 
pestiviruses are suspected, a panel of monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) can be used to differentiate CSFV 
from ruminant pestiviruses [34]. CSF antibodies are tagged with an enzyme and the chemical reaction that 
follows CSFV antigen and antibody binding produces the colored product [59]. Monoclonal antibodies 
can also be used to determine if CSF positive test was due to field or vaccine strains. Obviously, these 
MAbs do not need to be used if vaccine had not been administered [34]. 
4.1.3 Antigen-Capture ELISAs 
When testing a herd suspected of being infected with CSFV, the antigen-capture ELISA is a good tool for 
early diagnosis in live pigs [17]. Blood, tissues, plasma or serum specimens can be tested [59]. Because 
this test is less sensitive than PCR or virus isolation, in mild or subclinical cases, the test would be most 
valuable if all clinical animals are tested. For this reason, antigen-capture ELISAs are best used for herd 
testing when CSF is suspected and not as a surveillance tool in healthy herds or to diagnose a single 
animal [34]. The USDA’s National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) for the U.S., established in 2004, exists to 
help provide for state and local resources to fight 17 of the most dangerous animal diseases of which CSF 
is fifth on the list. In 2008, the NVS Classical Swine Fever Countermeasures Working Group (CSFCWG) 
[59] concluded that “there is a need for useful pen-side tests that can be used in an outbreak situation to 
make rapid decisions in the field about the status of a test herd.” 
4.1.4 Virus Isolation 
Virus isolation is a more sensitive test than FAT and ELISA. The tonsil is the tissue of choice for virus 
isolation, although spleen, kidney, ileum, or lymph nodes can be used [34]. Blood, plasma and tonsil 
scrapings can also be tested from live animals [59]. When using the PK-15 or SK-6 cell line, cultures are 
examined by FAT after 24 to 72 hours, or in 4- to 5-day-old cultures when utilizing immunoperoxidase 
staining [34, 59]. Samples for virus isolation should be refrigerated but not frozen; they should be kept 
cold during shipment to the laboratory [60]. 
 
While virus isolation is the test of choice when diagnosing/confirming CSFV due to its high sensitivity, it 
may not be preferred during an outbreak to test a large number of samples as it is labor intensive and 
takes too long to complete [17].  
4.1.5 Reverse Transcription- PCR  
Reverse-transcription PCR (RT-PCR) is especially useful in preclinical diagnosis of CSF [34]. It is 
accepted for CSF testing by the EU and other nations [34, 61]. The OIE recommends that it be used with 
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a confirmatory test due to the risk of false positives from laboratory contamination. It is more sensitive 
than the CSF antigen-capture ELISAs or virus isolation in this situation [34]. Harding et al. [62, 63] 
developed a reverse-transcriptase PCR procedure with a reported sensitivity of 100%. Blood samples 
from live pigs or tissues samples, including tonsil, spleen, ileum and lymph node, collected during 
necropsy can be utilized [17] with results in 48 hours [61]. 
 
PCR protocols are being used in laboratories around the world to both detect CSFV and to differentiate it 
from ruminant pestiviruses [34]. In some situations if feral swine are found dead and the tissue autolyzed, 
PCR might be the test of choice [61]. 
4.1.6 Real Time RT-PCR  
Real time RT-PCR (qRT-PCR) is more rapid as results can be available within 2 hours after the  
samples are prepared, and can be used when confirming a test result or in surveillance [59].These  
assays have been adapted using automation. Although a risk of false negative and positive results still 
exists, qRT-PCR has the potential to replace the Fluorescent antibody test and Antigen-capture ELISAs; 
however, virus isolation still will be necessary to isolate the virus for further testing [59]. 
 
Tonsil scrapings, tonsil, spleen, lymph node, blood and nasal swab are all samples that can be tested  
using qRT-PCT [64]. LSI (TagVet CSF) and ADIAGEN (Adiavet CSF) have developed kits which have 
been validated on pooled serum, blood and tonsils [59, 65]. Leifer et al. [66] developed real-time RT-PCR 
assays to differentiate CSFV field strains from either CP7_E2alf (discussed in section 5.6) or the C-strain 
“Riems” which could be used to immunize feral swine. 
4.2 Detecting Infected Animals by Serological Assays 
Serology is used for diagnosis and surveillance, especially when infection with a CSFV strain of low 
virulence is suspected [34]. Also, it is useful in the final phase of CSF eradication when trying to detect 
any positive animals that might remain in a breeding herd [34]. Antibodies may not be detected until 2-3 
weeks post-infection and can be present for the life of the animal [34, 67]. Congenitally infected pigs are 
immunotolerant and do not produce antibodies detectable on serology [26].  
 
When testing for antibodies, the most commonly used tests are virus neutralization tests, which include 
the neutralizing peroxidase-linked assay [68] and the fluorescent antibody virus neutralization test [69], 
and various ELISAs [34, 67]. The definitive test for differentiation from ruminant pestiviruses is the 
comparative neutralization test.
 
 
4.2.1 Virus Neutralizing Tests (VNTs) 
Due to the possibility that breeding herds may be infected with ruminant pestiviruses, tests that can 
differentiate ruminant pestivirus and CSF infections are necessary [34]. Performing virus neutralization 
tests (VNT) or ELISAs that use monoclonal antibodies provides for this differentiation. VNTs can be 
used to test both serum and plasma samples. When compared to ELISA, VNT is more sensitive especially 
when used for detecting antibodies in samples 10-14 days post infection [53]. The VNT recognizes all 
CSF genotypes, but the test is more sensitive when the same strain or a closely related viral strain is used 
to produce the test [53]. However, VNTs cannot differentiate between antibody titers produced from a 
field strain of CSFV versus those produced following administration of a modified live CSF vaccine [67]. 
Laboratories need to have high biocontainment facilities in order to perform this test [59]. 
4.2.1.1 Neutralizing Peroxidase-Linked Assay (NPLA) 
This prescribed test for international trade is preferred as it is easier to read than the Fluorescent antibody 
virus neutralization test [34]. Neutralizing peroxidase-linked assay is performed using the constant-
virus/varying-serum method. The test utilizes cell cultures; however, CSFV is noncytopathic. Because of 
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this characteristic, non-neutralized virus must be detected by an indicator. Immunoglobulin conjugated 
with Horseradish Peroxidase reacts with a chromogen-substrate solution to allow visualization of  
infected cells. Samples can sometimes be read with the naked eye, although use of an inverted light 
microscope is preferred. 
4.2.1.2 Fluorescent Antibody Virus Neutralization Test (FAVN) 
The fluorescent antibody virus neutralization test is similar to the assay described above and involves the 
observation of infected cells. However, the conjugate used allows for fluorescence of infected cells and 
must be detected by fluorescence microscopy.  
4.2.2 Antibody ELISAs 
Many techniques can be used as long as they minimize cross reactions with ruminant pestiviruses [34]. 
The only samples which can be used with antibody ELISAs are serum or plasma from individual pigs 
[34]. In 2008, the NVS CSFCWG [59] expressed concern that no currently available ELISA is fully 
capable of distinguishing between CSFV-specific antibodies and antibodies to other pestiviruses. In 2008, 
according to the CSFCWG report [59], the following five CSF-ELISA kits were commercially available: 
Herdcheck CSFV Antibody test kit (IDEXX Laboratories), Chekit-CSF-Sero and Chekit-CSF-Marker 
ELISAs (former Dr. Bommeli AG), Ceditest CSFV and Ceditest CSFV 2.0 test kits (Cedi-Diagnostics). 
As it detects Erns antibodies, the Chekit CSF Marker ELISA is a companion test for the Intervet E2 
marker vaccine and proves to be more useful when used at the herd level [59]. 
4.2.3 Serological Assays in Development 
In 2008, the NVS CSFCWG [59] recommended several additional diagnostic tests be improved or 
developed including tests to differentiate vaccinated animals from animals infected with the field strain as 
well as CSFV infection from exposure to ruminant pestiviruses.  
 
The companion DIVA tests for E2 subunit “marker” vaccines are ELISAs which detect antibody to the 
Erns protein [70, 71]. Having received approval from the European Commission [72], these tests are 
utilized to determine if a herd vaccinated with an E2 marker vaccine may also have been exposed to field 
virus. According to the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animal [34], neither 
discriminatory ELISA was able to consistently detect individual marker-vaccinated, CSF-challenged 
weaner pigs. Therefore, this technology was recommended to only be used at the herd level. 
4.3 The Use of Diagnostic Tests in Outbreaks 
Several countries and the European Union accept the use of qRT-PCR in suspect CSF cases as it is 
sensitive and can be performed rapidly [34, 61].However, as false positive results may occur, another test 
should be performed when an initial CSF positive may signal a CSF outbreak. 
 
Serological tests have limitations when utilized during a CSF outbreak. Antibodies may not be detected 
until 2-3 weeks post-infection, but can be present for the life of the animal [34, 67]. Therefore, serological 
tests may miss cases if samples are collected from animals which have not been exposed to CSFV long 
enough to produce antibodies. However, they are useful when monitoring for CSF cases or in surveillance 
programs [61]. 
 
In the 1997-98 CSF outbreak in the Netherlands, over 2 million samples were tested for CSF using 
several diagnostic tests [73]. FAT was utilized on tonsils to detect 74% of the positive tests. Over 140,000 
blood samples were tested using virus isolation. In Korea in 2003 [74], antibody and antigen ELISA and 
RT-PCR tests were utilized to detect CSF positive animals. 
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Real-time RT-PCR assays have been developed that show great potential to differentiate CSFV field 
strains from either CP7_E2alf (discussed in section 5.6) [66, 75] or the C-strain “Riems” when used to 
immunize feral swine [66]. Therefore, in European countries which are trying to eliminate CSFV from 
their wild boar populations, utilizing this DIVA technology may become more widely utilized. 
5. CSF VACCINES 
Summary 
Inactivated whole virus vaccines are not effective or available for use. 
 
Live Attenuated Virus (LAV) vaccines or Modified Live Virus (MLV) vaccines, made from attenuated 
CSFV strains, are the most widely used vaccines in countries with endemic CSF. In countries where CSF 
has become endemic in the feral swine population, oral vaccination of feral swine has been practiced 
using a LAV vaccine. 
 
Countries free of CSF may not allow the use of LAV vaccines because it is impossible to differentiate 
animals vaccinated with LAV vaccines from animals infected with the field strain using serology. 
 
Subunit ‘marker vaccines’ induce antibodies that can be distinguished from those produced by animals 
infected with the field strain utilizing an accompanying serological test. 
 
The ‘marker vaccines’ which have been marketed previously use the CSFV major envelope glycoprotein 
E2 produced in a baculovirus recombinant system. These vaccines have the potential to allow the 
Detection of Infection in Vaccinated Animals (DIVA). 
 
Because the E2 marker vaccine is produced by infecting insect cells with a baculovirus containing the E2 
CSFV gene, they do not contain live CSFV. Therefore, the final preparations contain the baculovirus 
which has been chemically inactivated and adjuvanted with mineral oils as a double or single emulsion 
using water and oil. Additional regulatory considerations may be applicable when discussing vaccines 
produced through biotechnology. 
 
For the U.S. National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS), in 2008 the CSFCWG recommended stockpiling CSF 
LAV Strain C vaccine and CSF E2 marker vaccine with the hope in the long term of adding a second 
generation CSF vaccine which is as effective as the CSF LAV vaccine strains but with DIVA capabilities. 
If marker vaccines are added to the NVS, the companion DIVA tests would need to be stockpiled also. 
 
A large number of LAVs are being marketed. Two E2 marker vaccines were registered in the EU, 
although only one manufacturer is currently producing this vaccine. 
 
For a vaccine to be given a full product license, the manufacturer must conduct extensive efficacy, purity 
and safety testing. 
 
Steps in the licensing of vaccines in the U.S. include a review of the data from the manufacturer to 
support the product and label claims; inspections of manufacturing processes and practices; confirmatory 
testing of the biological seeds, cells and product; post-licensing monitoring including inspections and 
random product testing; and post-marketing surveillance of product performance. 
 
Researchers utilized several different approaches when creating chimeric pestivirus marker vaccines with 
varying degrees of success when administering intramuscularly, intranasally, and oronasally.  
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5.1 Types of CSF Vaccines 
Inactivated whole virus vaccines are not effective or available for use [34]. In the past, when CSF 
vaccines have been utilized, LAV vaccines have been the only option available. Recently, however, a 
CSF E2 marker vaccine has been developed (but not currently marketed), and experimental vaccines 
continue to be developed and evaluated.  
5.1.1 CSF Live Attenuated Virus (LAV) Vaccines - also known as Modified Live Virus  
(MLV) Vaccines 
LAV vaccines, made from attenuated CSFV strains, [34] are the most widely used vaccines in countries 
with endemic CSFV according to Blome et al. [53]. Countries free of CSF may not allow the use of these 
vaccines because it is impossible to serologically detect infection in vaccinated animals (DIVA) when 
LAV vaccines are used [34]. This inability to detect infection by field virus in vaccinated animals may 
result in strict international trade restrictions on pork and pork products [59]. LAV vaccines may be used 
if CSF eradication is not possible so as to prevent the spread of the virus on a production site. Examples 
of such attenuated vaccines are the Chinese lapinised strain (CLS), sometimes called the C, K or LPC 
strain; the Japanese guinea pig cell-culture-adapted (GPE-) strain; the Thiveral strain (the French PK-15 
cell-adapted strain); and the Mexican PAV strain (the most common being the PAV-250 strain, from the 
250
th
 passage of  the A-PAV-1 strain) [15, 53].  
 
According to Blome et al. [53], the most widely used strain is the Chinese strain. The Japanese GPE- 
strain vaccines are used in Asian and Pacific countries, the Thiverval strain vaccines are produced in 
France, and the Mexican PAV strain vaccine is licensed in Mexico.  
5.1.1.1 LAV Administered Orally 
LAV vaccines can be administered orally, in addition to parenterally. In countries such as Germany where 
CSF has become endemic in feral swine, oral vaccination of feral swine has been practiced [76]. Baits 
containing vaccine were set on the ground and covered up. Younger animals did not consume the baits as 
well as the older animals, and because a LAV vaccine was utilized, the uptake of oxytetracycline was 
used to help differentiate vaccinated animals from animals infected with the field strain [76]. When feral 
swine consume the baits containing oxytetracycline, oxytetracycline can be found in the bones for at least 
4 months [76]. A fluorescence microscope was used to detect oxytetracycline from the foot, rib  
or breastbone. 
 
Kaden et al. [76] studied the use of oral vaccination of wild boar in field trials from 1993-1995. Animals 
initially received 2 doses approximately 14 days apart with booster doses every 6 months [76]. While the 
overall rate of uptake of the baits was between 85-100%, less than 50% of the younger animals took the 
baits and became immunized [76].  
 
Several studies have been conducted since the 2000 Kaden et al. study, in an attempt to improve the 
immunization of wild boar. In 2010, Rossi et al. [77] reported on a double vaccination protocol tested in 
France from 2005-2007. Each year, 500,000 baits were buried by hunters on wild boar feeding grounds. 
Rossi et al. reported that the effectiveness of the vaccination effort could not be improved by increasing 
the number of baits per wild boar. However, they did confirm that preventative vaccination is an 
important part of a CSF control program. Research needs to continue to determine the best strategy for 
immunizing feral swine/wild boars. 
 
Refer to section 13. for field experiences with oral vaccine in Germany and Romania. 
  
FAD PReP/NAHEMS Guidelines: Appendix B: Vaccination for Classical Swine Fever (2012)               13 
 
5.1.2 CSF E2 Marker Vaccine 
DIVA vaccines (also called “marker” or “subunit” vaccines) contain one or more protective antigens, but 
do not contain one or more viral antigens that induce antibodies when vaccinated animals are exposed to 
wild-type virus. Each marker vaccine has an accompanying serological test which must be able to 
distinguish that vaccinated herds are not infected with the field virus [34]. 
 
The ‘marker vaccines’ which have been marketed previously used the CSFV major envelope glycoprotein 
E2 produced in a baculovirus recombinant system [78, 79]. Of the three envelope glycoproteins, E2 is 
believed to be the most immunogenic, inducing a neutralizing antibody response in pigs [79-82]. 
Researchers have developed E2 subunit CSF marker vaccines in which neutralizing antibodies are formed 
against the E2 glycoprotein only [82]. Therefore, any antibodies formed against other proteins of the CSF 
virus would have been formed due to infection with a field strain [70]. If the test result is negative, the pig 
was either seronegative, naïve or had been vaccinated whereas a positive result indicated the pig had been 
exposed to the field virus [59]. This is the basis for the companion discriminatory tests which detect 
antibodies to the Erns glycoprotein [70, 83]. These DIVA tests are not sufficiently sensitive to reliably 
detect individual animals that are infected. They are used on a herd basis.  
 
In one study by de Smit et al. [84], when a single dose of an E2 marker vaccine was administered 
followed by challenge, some pigs developed a fever and two of eighteen became viremic, however, the 
virus was not transmitted from vaccinated and challenged pigs to unvaccinated sentinel pigs. E2 marker 
vaccines demonstrate protection two weeks after an initial and booster vaccination or six weeks following 
a single vaccination [53, 78, 81, 85]. This delay in the onset of a protective immune response against CSF 
infection makes these vaccines less useful when faced with an outbreak [59].  
 
These marker vaccines are safe as they do not contain any CSFV and the baculovirus is inactivated [34]. 
Bouma et al. [86] tested the stability of an E2 marker vaccine and documented that the vaccine was stable 
at 4
o
C for at least 18 months after being produced, and retained its full potency. 
 
Marker vaccines continue to be developed and improved [34]. Two marker vaccines have been registered 
in the EU. PORCILIS
®
 PESTI (Merck-Intervet Schering-Plough Animal Health) is one of the commercial 
vaccines available with its accompanying discriminatory ELISA Chekit Marker
®
. The PORCILIS® 
PESTI vaccine is temporarily off the market due to technical issues. The second commercial vaccine is 
BAYOVAC
®
 CSF Marker (Bayer) with its accompanying discriminatory ELISA Ceditest Marker
®
. The 
Bayer vaccine is also not available at this time. 
5.2 Production of CSF Vaccines 
5.2.1 Live Attenuated Virus Vaccines 
OIE requirements for Containment Group 4 need to be met when CSFV is used to produce CSF vaccine 
[34]. In the United States, CSF is listed on the National Select Agent Registry. According to APHIS 
Select Agents Regulations (9 CFR Part 121), classical swine fever poses a potential threat to animal 
health. Vaccine production tends to be driven by market demand, and currently, the U.S. does not have a 
market for CSF vaccine. Therefore, because CSF is listed on the National Select Agent Registry and the 
lack of demand for the CSF vaccine, CSF vaccine is not manufactured in the U.S. Conditions for the 
production of LAV vaccines are addressed in the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for 
Terrestrial Animals [34]. 
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5.2.2 E2 Marker Vaccines 
Because the E2 marker vaccine is produced by infecting insect cells with a baculovirus containing the E2 
CSFV gene, they do not contain live CSFV [34]. Final preparations contain chemically inactivated 
baculovirus, adjuvanted with mineral oils as a double or single emulsion using water and oil.  
 
Additional regulatory considerations may be applicable when discussing vaccines produced through 
biotechnology. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 requires the review and approval 
by the appropriate federal agency to evaluate the potential impact of an organism containing recombinant 
DNA on the environment [87]. The Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) will review experiments 
performed for licensure when they are performed within a facility; whereas the USDA Center for 
Veterinary Biologics (CVB) must give the approval when those experiments are field trials conducted 
prior to licensure that involve environmental release [87]. 
5.3 Vaccine Banks 
Vaccine banks (also known as antigen banks or strategic reserves) store a variety of vaccines which can 
be used if an outbreak occurs. Banks may contain either ready-to-use vaccines or vaccine antigens that 
will be formulated, if needed, into complete vaccines.  
 
Some experts agree that when a contingency plan includes the possible use of CSF vaccine in an 
emergency vaccination protocol, CSFV vaccine banks should be established [78, 88]. For the European 
Union Vaccine Bank, recommendations include at least 2 million doses of LAV vaccine, possibly E2-
marker vaccine or a new modified live marker vaccine provided the vaccines prove effective [88]. With 
E2 marker vaccine or live marker vaccine, the companion diagnostic test would be necessary. 
 
For the U.S. National Veterinary Stockpile, in 2008 the CSFCWG [59] recommended stockpiling CSF 
LAV Strain C vaccine and CSF E2 marker vaccine (Merck-Intervet) with the hope in the long term of 
adding a second generation CSF vaccine which is as effective as the CSF LAV vaccine strains but has 
DIVA capabilities. The addition of marker vaccines to the NVS would require the companion DIVA tests 
to be included in the stockpile to take advantage of the DIVA properties. Therefore, the CSFCWG [59] 
also recommended stockpiling the Chekit CSF Marker ELISA (Merck-Intervet) as well as a PCR test, 
Nucleic acid extraction kits and supplies, and PCR reagents and supplies. The long term goal for the NVS 
would be to have a pen side test kit available for use during an outbreak to rapidly detect any CSFV  
field strain.  
 
According to the NVS fact sheet [89], the NVS contains two CSF vaccines. One vaccine is a LAV 
vaccine. The second vaccine is a DIVA-compatible E2 antigen-based CSF vaccine utilizing killed 
baculovirus vector technology. 
5.4 CSF Vaccines from Commercial Manufacturers 
A large number of LAVs are being marketed. Table 1 lists many of the vaccines by the manufacturer 
producing each vaccine. Generally speaking, LAV vaccines protect against challenge beginning 4 days 
post vaccination, lasting more than one year and maybe even lifelong [38, 90]. C-strain vaccine and 
chimeric vaccines have prevented clinical signs and transmission when vaccinated pigs are challenged 7 
days post vaccination [30, 91]. 
 
Two E2 marker vaccines were registered in the EU. Both vaccines were produced with the baculovirus 
expression system [92]. PORCILIS
®
 PESTI (Merck Intervet Schering-Plough Animal Health) was one of 
the commercial vaccines available with its accompanying discriminatory ELISA Chekit Marker
®
.  
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During a transmission experiment, PORCILIS® PESTI was not able to prevent clinical signs or block 
transmission when vaccinated pigs were challenged 7 days post vaccination [30] .The second commercial 
vaccine was BAYOVAC
®
 CSF Marker (Bayer) with its accompanying discriminatory ELISA  
Ceditest Marker
®
. 
 
Table 1. Vaccine Manufacturers, Classical Swine Fever 
Manufacturer Product Name Type Strain/Subtype Adjuvant 
Licensed 
Countries 
Agrovet Classical Swine 
Fever (LK-
VNIIVVIM) 
Live LK-VNIIVVIM None Russia 
Classical Swine 
Fever (VGNKI) 
Live K None Russia 
Subivac Unknown Unknown None Russia 
Bestar 
Laboratories 
Ltd. 
BSL-HC Live GPE Unknown Singapore 
BIO-TONG S.A. Colertong Live Chinese 
(lapinized) 
None Peru 
Bioveta Pertisen C Live Chinese None Czech Republic 
Ceva Sante 
Animale 
COGLAPEST® Live Unknown Unknown France, United 
Kingdom 
Chengdu 
Tianbang Bio-
Products Ltd. 
Corp. 
Name 
Unknown 
Live Unknown Unknown China 
ChoongAng 
Vaccine 
Laboratories 
Co., Ltd. 
SuiShot® HC Unknown Unknown Unknown 
 
South Korea 
SuiShot® HE 
(Classical 
Swine Fever, 
Swine 
Erysipelas) 
Unknown Unknown Unknown South Korea 
Empresa 
Colombiana de 
Productos 
Veterinarios 
S.A. (Vecol) 
COLERVEC® Live Chinese 
(lapinized) 
None Colombia 
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Manufacturer Product Name Type Strain/Subtype Adjuvant 
Licensed 
Countries 
Institut Pasteur Pestivac Live IP-77 None Romania 
Pestruvac 
(Classical 
Swine Fever, 
Swine 
Erysipelas) 
Live VR 2 (SE) None Romania 
Komipharm 
International 
Co., Ltd. 
HC-VAC Live LOM None South Korea 
Kyoritsu 
Seiyaku 
Corporation 
Classical Swine 
Fever Vaccine 
Live GPE None Japan 
LABIOFAM Vacuna Colera 
Porcino 
Live China None Cuba 
Laboratorio de 
Dianostico Y 
Prevencion 
Veterinario 
(LaDiPreVet) 
Peste V Live China None Argentina 
Malaysian 
Vaccines and 
Pharmaceuticals 
MVP Swine 
Fever GPE 
Live GPE Unknown Malaysia 
Merial 
Philippines 
Pestiffa® Live Chinese None Philippines 
Merial Russia Pestiffa® Live Chinese None Russia 
Merial SAS 
(France) 
Pestiffa® Live Chinese None Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, 
Former Yug. Rep of 
Macedonia, France, 
Germany, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Peru, 
Philippines, Russia, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, 
Venezuela, Vietnam 
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Manufacturer Product Name Type Strain/Subtype Adjuvant 
Licensed 
Countries 
MSD Animal 
Health (Merck) 
PORCIVAC® Live PAV-250 None Mexico 
PORCILIS CSF 
Live 
Live GPE- Unknown Netherlands, 
Philippines 
PORCILIS 
Pesti 
Marker CSFV-E2 Oil Peru, Philippines, 
Russia, Venezuela 
National 
Biologicos 
Producer 
Veterinarios 
(PRONABIVE) 
Pav Plus 250 Live PAV-250 None Mexico 
Philippines 
Bureau of 
Animal Industry 
Hog Cholera 
Vaccine 
Live Unknown None Philippines 
Romvac Rompestivac Live RP93 None Romania 
State Research 
Institution (SRI) 
Classical Swine 
Fever Vaccine 
Unknown LK-VNIIVViM Unknown Russia 
VETERINA 
Animal Health 
Ltd. 
Plivak®-KS Live Chinese None Belarus, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Former 
Yug. Rep. of 
Macedonia, Serbia 
and Montenegro, 
Slovenia, Vietnam 
 
1. Adapted from the Center for Food Security and Public Health, Vaccine List, Classical Swine Fever. 
Available at:  
http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Vaccines/disease_list.php?disease=classical-swine-fever&lang=en 
5.5 Vaccine Licensing 
The USDA CVB, the USDA NVS, and other agencies may be involved in evaluating and purchasing 
vaccine antigen concentrates and/or finished routine or emergency use vaccines [93]. NVS may also 
contract with manufacturers for immediate access to existing stocks of licensed emergency use vaccines. 
Vaccines may be licensed by the CVB and distributed with a full product license, or they may receive a 
conditional biologics license for use in specific conditions, e.g., if the product will be used by or under the 
supervision of the USDA in an emergency animal disease outbreak [93].  
 
For a vaccine to be given a full product license, the manufacturer must conduct extensive efficacy, purity 
and safety testing [93, 94]. Steps in the licensing of vaccines in the U.S. include a review of the data from 
the manufacturer to support the product and label claims; inspections of manufacturing processes and 
practices; confirmatory testing of the biological seeds, cells and product; post-licensing monitoring 
including inspections and random product testing; and post-marketing surveillance of product 
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performance [93]. In standard licensing, the seed materials, product ingredients and final product must be 
completely characterized and tested for purity. Safety and efficacy tests must also be done, and product 
stability as well as duration of immunity (DOI) must be evaluated. All of these steps may not be possible 
during an animal disease emergency. The USDA has mechanisms for expedited product approval, and can 
exempt products from some of the regulatory requirements for full product approval during emergencies 
[93]. However, every attempt is made by the CVB to establish a reasonable expectation of purity, safety, 
potency and efficacy prior to the use of any vaccine. In addition to potential harm to animal, human and 
environmental health, the risk of lawsuits if problems occur must be considered [93]. 
5.6 Experimental Vaccines  
5.6.1 Chimeric Pestivirus Marker Vaccines 
Researchers utilized several different approaches when creating chimeric pestivirus marker vaccines. Van 
Gennip et al. [95, 96] replaced antigenic regions of the CSFV with genes from the BVDV II strain 5250. 
These chimeric viruses protected animals against CSFV during challenge. The animals challenged with 
these chimeric viruses produced antibodies that could be discriminated from those produced by animals 
infected with the field strain using specific ELISAs [59, 95, 96]. 
 
The modified live vaccine CP7_E2alf was produced by replacing the E2 region of BVDV strain CP7 with 
the E2 region of CSFV strain Alfort 187 [96-98]. This vaccine protected against challenge and vaccinated 
animals were negative for anti-CSFV Erns antibodies when tested with its companion diagnostic test, the 
PRIONICS CSF-specific Erns antibody ELISA [59, 96]. The effectiveness of the C-strain vaccine was 
compared to CP7_E2alf, which was administered oronasally [99]. CP7_E2alf was isolated from the tonsil 
as early as 4 days following vaccination and induced an immune response lasting up to 98 days following 
oronasal administration. In comparison, the C-strain vaccine was isolated from the tonsil as early as 3 
days following vaccination and also induced an immune response lasting up to 98 days [99]. 
 
Reimann et al. [100] constructed a new BVDV chimera utilizing the previously created CP7_E2alf. The 
chimeric pestivirus CP7_E1E2alf_TLA was created by substituting BVDV E1 and E2 with the E1 and E2 
regions of CSFV strain Alford 187. The antigenic epitope CSFV-specific TAVSPTTLR was then 
exchanged with the E-2 epitope of BVDV strain CP7 in order to be able to differentiate vaccine from field 
strain when performing serology [100]. Following vaccination with CP7_E1E2alf_TLA and challenge 
with CSFV strain Koslov 28 days post-vaccination, pigs had a short increase in body temperature. This 
chimera was not able to protect pigs as effectively as the C-strain vaccine, and did not provide total 
differentiation between vaccinated animals and those infected with the field strain. 
 
As only live vaccines can be administered orally, chimeric marker vaccines may be useful when 
attempting to immunize feral swine against CSFV when using baits [98]. 
 
Holinka et al. [101] reported the development of a CSFV antigenic marker live attenuated CSFV strain 
Flag T4v, containing a positive antigenic marker, synthetic Flag® epitope, and a negative marker created 
with the removal of an epitope recognized by monoclonal antibody WH303 (mAbWH303). It was created 
by combining RB-C22 [19] and T4 [18] CSF Brescia viruses [59]. Flag T4v has been administered both 
intranasally and intramuscularly. Complete protection against CSF strain Brescia at 3 and 28 days post 
infection occurred when Flag T4v was administered intranasally and starting at 2 days post infection 
when administered intramuscularly [101]. Animals given FlagT4v can be differentiated from animals 
infected with wild CSFV, as those immunized will respond serologically against the Flag epitope [59, 
101] and will not respond to the negative marker.  
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Another approach undergoing investigation has been to utilize viral vector systems with viruses such as 
pseudorabies (PRV) [80, 85, 102, 103], porcine adenovirus [104-107], and swinepox virus [96, 108]. 
When pigs have been immunized with pseudorabies vector system with glycoprotein E1 inserted from the 
CSFV, pigs were protected against both CSFV and PRV [80]. 
6. VACCINE MATCHING, POTENCY AND SAFETY 
Summary 
While vaccine matching is commonly used with Foot and Mouth Disease, the process is not utilized with 
classical swine fever as strain variation requiring different vaccines for different strains does not occur 
with CSFV. 
 
Vaccine potency is determined through a dose response study. 
 
Overall, CSF LAV (Chinese lapinized strain (C, K or LPC), GPE strain and the Thiverval strain) vaccines 
are considered safe to be administered intramuscularly or orally to all ages of pigs including neonatal and 
pregnant swine. 
 
Marker vaccines are generally considered to be low-risk for animal safety, aside from occasional tissue 
reactions at the injection site. 
6.1 Vaccine Matching 
Vaccine matching is used to determine whether a given vaccine is likely to provide good protection 
against a field strain. While vaccine matching is commonly used with Foot and Mouth Disease, the 
process is not utilized with classical swine fever as strain variation requiring different vaccines for 
different strains does not occur with CSFV. 
6.2 Vaccine Potency 
Potency is traditionally expressed as the number of 50 percent swine protective doses (PD50) within each 
dose of vaccine recommended on the label. The PD50 determination is a dose response study. Two groups 
of 6-8 week old pigs, with 5 piglets per group, are used [34]. The groups are vaccinated intramuscularly 
with two different partial doses (a 1/40 and a 1/160 dilution). Two additional animals are nonvaccinated 
controls. All animals are challenged with 10
5
 PID50 (50% porcine infectious dose) of a CSF virulent strain 
administered intramuscularly 2 weeks after vaccination. Within two weeks, the nonvaccinated control 
animals should die. Using the numbers of animals that live and do not demonstrate any clinical signs due 
to CSF, statistical calculations will determine the number of PD50 in the vaccine [34]. As reviewed by 
Biront et al. [38], Leunen and Strobbe [109]vaccinated animals intramuscularly with the C-strain vaccine 
and challenged14 days post vaccination with the Behring strain. Results of this study led European 
Pharmacopeia to require a potency of at least 100 PD50 per dose. When animals were again challenged 
with the Behring strain by Biront et al. [38], animals vaccinated with 160 PD50 were protected by one 
week post vaccination according to the review by Blome et al. [53]. 
 
If a manufacturer can prove a ‘distinct and reproducible relationship’ between the amount of virus in their 
vaccine and the protection for the challenged pigs, the manufacturer may be allowed to replace the in vivo 
potency test with an in vitro cell infectivity assay [34]. 
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6.3 Vaccine Safety 
In general, safety assessments for vaccines vary with the type of vaccine (inactivated or live, bacterial or 
viral), the adjuvants used, and the history of similar products in use, as well as the dose, vaccine claims, 
usage regimen and animal factors such as the species [110]. The ‘worst case’ scenario is usually assessed 
even if it is unlikely, assuming that the product will be used at its maximum potency and quantity, in 
animals of the highest sensitivity. Safety concerns include both manufacturing errors and user errors that 
could cause problems [110]. 
 
Overall, CSF LAV (Chinese lapinized strain (C, K or LPC), GPE strain and the Thiverval strain) vaccines 
are considered safe to be administered intramuscularly or orally to all ages of pigs including neonatal and 
pregnant swine [59, 90, 111]. Marker vaccines are generally considered to be low-risk for animal safety 
[110], aside from occasional tissue reactions at the injection site [78, 86, 112, 113]. CSF E2 marker 
vaccines, however, are only given parenterally, not orally [111]. 
 
In the U.S. the USDA Center for Veterinary Biologics will determine the recommended ages for vaccine 
administration, whether it is approved for use in pregnant swine and recommended revaccination 
frequency. This information will accompany the vaccine. 
 
Adjuvants and other vaccine ingredients may cause local or systemic reactions in some animals [110]. 
The E2 marker vaccine has produced a local tissue reaction at the injection site [86]. Contamination of 
vaccines by extraneous pathogens could also cause morbidity or mortality [110], for example a C-strain 
vaccine was contaminated with another pestivirus [57, 78]. Consideration should be given to the 
possibility of interactions with other vaccines [110]. 
 
Risks to people who administer or contact the vaccine should also be assessed. The LAV CSF vaccine 
will not replicate in humans. However, local reactions from oil adjuvants, other ingredients, or infection 
at the injection site may occur [110]. 
7. VACCINE WITHDRAWAL TIMES IN MEAT 
Because vaccination does not usually result in harmful residues or immune responses that differ from 
natural immune responses, countries do not necessarily require a withdrawal period for the antigen 
component in a conventional vaccine, unless it is a live virus zoonotic agent [110]. Other vaccine 
components such as adjuvants and excipients must also be considered in the safety evaluation, and may 
require withdrawal periods [110]. Prior experiences with these components in other vaccines should be 
considered [110]. Marketed internationally, the two previously available CSFV marker vaccines both 
listed zero withdrawal times. 
 
However, in the U.S., withdrawal times before animals may be slaughtered after vaccination with specific 
products are established by the USDA Center for Veterinary Biologics, and will be found on the vaccine 
label. Due to regulatory requirements, all vaccines for food animals in the U.S. must be labeled with a 
minimum slaughter withdrawal time of 21 days.  
8. VACCINES AND DIVA TESTS AVAILABLE IN THE U.S. 
In 2008, the NVS CSFCWG [59] conducted an in-depth analysis of available measures to control and 
eradicate CSFV if an outbreak were to occur in the U.S. They recommended stockpiling CSF LAV Strain 
C vaccine and CSF E2 marker vaccine (Intervet) with the hope in the long term of adding a second 
generation CSF vaccine which is as effective as the CSF LAV vaccine strains but has DIVA capabilities. 
If marker vaccines in the NVS are used to control an outbreak, companion DIVA tests would need to be 
available also. Therefore, the CSFCWG also recommended stockpiling the Chekit CSF Marker ELISA 
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(Intervet) as well as a PCR test, Nucleic acid extraction kits and supplies, and PCR reagents and supplies 
[59]. A long term goal for the NVS would be to have a pen-side test kit available for use during an 
outbreak to rapidly detect any CSFV field strain.  
9. EFFECTS OF VACCINATION ON VIRUS TRANSMISSION 
The main purpose of emergency vaccination is to end or reduce virus transmission. This can be 
accomplished by vaccines that increase the minimum infectious dose of virus, and/or decrease virus 
shedding from animals that become infected. 
 
The reproduction ratio or R value estimates the ability of a vaccine to reduce transmission of the virus in a 
field situation. If vaccination decreases R to less than one, the epidemic will die out and only minor 
outbreaks are expected (however, some transmission is still expected to occur until the epidemic ends) 
[114]. If R remains higher than 1, there can be major outbreaks and the epidemic may continue to grow. 
Reproduction ratios can be estimated within herds (R0) and between herds (Rh).  
 
A baculovirus vector E2 marker vaccine produced by Moormann et al. [115] administered as a single 
dose prevented virus transmission to unvaccinated in-contact animals when challenged 3 weeks after 
vaccination. A transmission experiment was designed to estimate the R value of the virus. At one week 
after vaccination, the R value was >1, whereas in another challenge 2 weeks after vaccination, the R value 
was <1. Transplacental transmission of the challenge CSFV was prevented in 8 out of 9 animals when a 
single vaccination was administered; however, transmission to offspring was prevented when the sow 
received two vaccinations, then challenged 70 days after the second vaccination [115]. 
 
Dewulf et al. [30] compared a C-strain LAV vaccine and an E2 marker vaccine in preventing illness and 
virus transmission at 7 days after vaccination. The C-strain vaccine prevented illness and virus 
transmission in all pigs challenged via CSF inoculation, and prevented illness in vaccinated pigs in 
contact with CSFV-inoculated animals. However, all the pigs vaccinated with the E2 marker vaccine 
became clinically ill when challenged at 7 days and many of the vaccinated pigs in contact with the 
CSFV-inoculated animals became viremic [30]. 
 
Another concern during an outbreak is the infectivity of rendered animals. When animals are vaccinated 
with a LAV vaccine, then infected at least 4 days later with CSFV, the carcass has very little risk of 
infecting other animals with CSFV [111]. 
10. ONSET OF PROTECTIVE IMMUNITY 
The onset of protective immunity varies between vaccination with LAV vaccines and E2 marker vaccine. 
Protective immunity can be induced within a few days when LAV strains C, GPE, Thriveral and PAV-
250 are utilized [59]. A single vaccination may protect animals by day 5-6 [90, 116] with neutralizing 
antibodies detectable by day 7-10 post vaccination [90]. While LAVs induce immunity within a few days, 
E2 marker vaccines may not protect animals from challenge until two to three weeks after vaccination 
with a single injection [59, 86, 115, 117] although a second injection is recommended. 
 
The onset of protection for chimeric virus vaccines may differ with route of administration. Holinka et al. 
[101] investigated intranasal and intramuscular administration of FlagT4v. Pigs were protected when 
challenged with CSFV starting at 2 days following intramuscular injection of FlagT4v, whereas intranasal 
administration induced complete protection when challenged at days 3 and 28 [101]. 
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11. DURATION OF IMMUNITY 
Duration of immunity for LAV vaccines varies from 10 months with oral administration [118] to lifelong 
CSF immunity with a single intramuscular vaccination [59, 78, 90]. E2 marker vaccines, however, induce 
a shorter immunity of approximately 6 to13 months [59, 84, 86, 115, 117]. 
12. LIMITATIONS OF EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
Extrapolation from experimental studies to the field situation must be done with care. For example, the R 
value can be affected by the density of animals and their interactions, as well as the infectivity and 
susceptibility of individual animals ([119] cited in [120]). Vaccine efficacy can vary due to concurrent 
diseases and other factors, and animals will be exposed to field viruses at different times after vaccination, 
rather than at a defined interval. Epidemics are also unpredictable, and experiments can never reproduce 
all possibilities.  
13. FIELD EXPERIENCES WITH CSF VACCINATION 
Summary 
Vaccines that meet the standards for safety and efficacy and are administered correctly have the potential 
to decrease circulation of the virus, thereby reducing economic losses in different situations. 
 
Countries have utilized a variety of approaches to control or eradicate CSFV. Several countries have 
utilized LAV vaccines in domestic swine including Brazil, Bulgaria, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Romania and 
the United States. 
 
Bulgaria utilized LAV vaccine in an emergency vaccination protocol, including the vaccination of  
wild boars. 
 
LAV vaccine was utilized for years in Romania and Brazil. In Romania, vaccine was mandatory from 
1974 to 2001, then not allowed, but emergency vaccination was reinstated in 2006. In 2007, oral LAV 
vaccine contained in baits was also used to vaccinate the wild boar population. In Brazil, the country was 
divided into different areas and vaccine continues to be used in endemic areas. 
 
Israel only utilized a small number of vaccine doses in 2010. 
 
Various approaches have been tested in Germany to administer oral LAV vaccine in baits to feral swine. 
 
Mexico utilized both the commercially available marker vaccine Porcilis Pesti manufactured by Intervet 
in 1998 and LAV vaccines in 2001 in an attempt to control spread of CSFV. 
 
LAV vaccine was used successfully to eradicate CSFV in Korea by 2001; however, when the country re-
broke with CSFV in April 2002, use of emergency CSF vaccination was utilized in areas surrounding the 
outbreaks while stamping-out was also conducted in the infected areas. In 2003, the Republic of Korea 
instituted a national vaccination policy. 
 
Great Britain and the Netherlands both successfully eradicated CSFV without the use of vaccination, 
although the outbreaks vary greatly in the extent to which the countries were affected. In 2000, Great 
Britain culled 75,000 pigs to control disease spread while in 1997-1998 the Netherlands destroyed more 
than 11 million pigs to eradicate CSFV. 
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13.1 Brazil 
From approximately 1980-1990, vaccination with the C-strain LAV vaccine was extensively utilized 
[121]. However, in 1992, a new plan was implemented as eradication appeared to be impossible with the 
current approach. The difficulty in eradicating CSFV from Brazil with the earlier program was mainly 
due to the large size of the country [121]. The new plan included subdividing Brazil into three areas. Area 
I was made up of the three southern states. This area was free of CSFV, and vaccination was prohibited. 
Area II included states with endemic CSFV. These states had a relatively large swine population, and 
vaccination was made mandatory. The remainder of the country comprised Area III. In Area III, raising 
swine was not viewed as significant, so vaccination was not made mandatory [122]. The swine industry 
stakeholders from each of the states in Area I created a private fund to cover expenses if herd 
depopulation was needed during an outbreak [122]. This plan was very successful, and by 1998, the use 
of CSF vaccine was prohibited in all of Brazil except when directed by the Ministry of Agriculture [123]. 
 
In 2001, regions in the south, southwest, central-west and the states of Bahia and Sergipe were declared 
CSFV free [121]. At that time, the country was divided into two regions - one region had been free of 
CSFV since 1998 and in the second region, CSFV is endemic [121]. About 75% of Brazil’s swine 
production occurs in the CSF Free zone [124]. Although Brazil was trying to eliminate the use of CSF 
vaccine, several States in the Northeast region (considered the CSF Infected zone) utilized live attenuated 
vaccines in 2001 to control CSF outbreaks [124]. During 2001, twelve CSF outbreaks occurred, zero in 
2002 and four in 2003 all in the CSF Infected zone [124]. 
 
Although no outbreaks were reported in 2004, during 2006-2008, CSF outbreaks continued to occur 
outside of the area free of CSF. Outbreaks were resolved utilizing disinfection, quarantine and stamping-
out [125]. In February 2009, Brazil notified the OIE of a CSF case in a modern swine facility outside of 
the area free of CSF [125]. The report stated that vaccine was not used as vaccine is prohibited in the 
infected area as well as throughout the country of Brazil. However, following additional outbreaks during 
April and May 2009, the Animal Health Department approved the use of vaccine for pigs in the State of 
Rio Grande do Norte [125]. During 2009, Brazil utilized an attenuated live vaccine to control confirmed 
CSF outbreaks in their area considered CSF endemic. Over 90,000 pigs received the vaccine [125]. 
Vaccine was not utilized in the area free of CSF, and remains prohibited in the rest of the country  
of Brazil. 
13.2 Bulgaria 
In March 2000, four month old pigs were diagnosed with CSF in eastern Bulgaria [40]. In 2006, Bulgaria 
received approval to utilize emergency vaccination to eradicate CSFV [10]. Backyard pigs tested positive 
in May 2008. A control program, including vaccination in wild boar, was implemented for all of Bulgaria 
in an effort to eradicate CSFV in the wild boar population [126]. In spite of utilizing vaccine, in 
September 2009, CSF was diagnosed in wild boar in northern Bulgaria close to the Romania border.  
13.3 Germany 
Between 1990-1998, 424 CSF outbreaks were reported in domestic pigs in Germany with additional cases 
diagnosed in wild boars [36]. Available information suggests direct or indirect contact with infected wild 
boars or swill feeding was responsible for a majority of outbreaks in domestic pigs. 
 
In February 2002, the European Commission (2002/161/EC) [127] approved the use of CSF vaccine in 
feral pigs by oral immunization in specific areas of Germany. Those areas where vaccine was used were 
modified in October 2002 [128] and February 2003 [129] . Oral baits containing a LAV vaccine based on 
the ‘C’ strain were utilized to immunize wild boar [129].  
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13.4 Great Britain 
During the last CSF outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2000, 16 farms were affected with about 75,000 
pigs culled to control disease spread [130].  
 
Article 19 of EU Directive 2001/89/EC [9] authorizes the use of CSF vaccine if needed to control disease 
spread when used in conjunction with other control measures such as stamping-out and disinfection. 
Therefore, according to the Classical Swine Fever Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain, “the policy 
is not to vaccinate against CSF, although it is available should the disease situation require it” [130]. If it 
is determined that CSF vaccine needs to be utilized to eradicate the disease in Great Britain, an 
emergency vaccination plan must be submitted to and approved by the European Commission [9]. 
Vaccine could then be acquired from the European Union bank [130]. 
13.5 Israel 
According to the OIE website [131], CSF infection was confirmed in both domestic and wild animals in 
2009. Domestic animals tested positive on a farm near the Lebanon border. Wild boars found dead in the 
area also tested positive for CSF antigen, therefore, the wild boars were suspected as a possible source of 
infection for the domestic herd. Fomites were also listed as a possible source. Vaccination, modified 
stamping-out and disinfection were listed as measures to be taken to eradicate CSFV [132]. Israel did not 
report using any CSF vaccine to the OIE during 2009, but utilized 500 doses of CSF vaccine during  
2010 [133]. 
13.6 Mexico 
In 1996, Mexico was divided into three zones 1) the area free of CSF, 2) the eradication area, and 3) the 
control area. In the free and eradication areas, CSF vaccine was prohibited, whereas CSF vaccine was 
mandatory in the control area [134]. However, in 1998 a CSF outbreak occurred in the eradication area 
[134], an area free of CSFV since 1996. CSF infected pigs from the backyard pig population in the 
control area in Mexico were believed to be the source of the infection. Producers approached the 
government asking for approval of the commercially available marker vaccine Porcilis Pesti 
manufactured by Merck [134, 135]. The vaccine was registered for use in 1998, and vaccination with the 
marker vaccine was allowed in the eradication area to prevent spread of CSFV [135]. Martens et al. [135] 
studied the use of this vaccine in the field during this time. They concluded that the vaccine was useful in 
reducing clinical signs and limiting the spread of new outbreaks. 
 
In August 1999, a CSF outbreak was reported in San Carlos, along the United States-Mexican border 
[136]. San Carlos is in the State of Tamaulipas which was thought to be CSF-free. The CSF infected pigs 
originated from a family production unit, which commonly includes a few head of free-ranging animals 
which may be fed swill [136]. The outbreak was eradicated using several control measures, some 
including quarantine, stamping-out and stop movement, but vaccine was not utilized [136]. 
 
However, by 2000, CSF outbreaks were occurring in both the eradication area and control areas in 
Mexico and CSF LAV vaccine was being used regularly to control these outbreaks [134]. In 2001, 
Mexico was then divided into just two areas with the northern-most states remaining CSF free while in 
the rest of the country CSF had become endemic. Infection and movement of backyard pigs was thought 
to be the main reason for CSFV spread in Mexico and the only way to eradicate CSFV from Mexico 
would be to focus on this population [134]. 
 
According to the OIE website [137], Mexico had 15 outbreaks from 2002-2004 , two new outbreaks of 
CSF in 2005, no CSF cases in 2006-2008, 4 new outbreaks in 2009, and free of CSF during 2010-2011. In 
2009, the 704 susceptible animals were destroyed.  
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13.7 Netherlands 
The Netherlands had been free of CSFV for more than 10 years, until CSFV was detected in the 
Netherlands on February 4, 1997 in a pig dense area. By the time it was detected, it was estimated to have 
been in the country for at least 5-7 weeks [138]. During the outbreak which lasted from February 1997 to 
May 1998, more than 11 million pigs were destroyed and more than 13,000 farms involved [5]. At the 
time of the outbreak, vaccination for CSF was not allowed in the Netherlands unless special approval was 
granted for its use in an emergency vaccination program [9] in conjunction with other control measures. 
Only the Ministry of Agriculture can decide if vaccines will be utilized, which vaccines would be used 
and how they would be used within a program [139]. Only veterinarians can administer the CSF vaccine 
and only registered CSF vaccines may be used. Stamping-out and stop movement orders were the main 
tools used to eradicate CSFV from the Netherlands during this outbreak [8].  
13.8 Republic of Korea 
CSF was first reported in the Republic of Korea in 1908, but by 1947 CSFV had become endemic with 
many outbreaks to follow over the next several years [140]. In 1967, a tissue culture attenuated live 
vaccine, LOM-850 vaccine, was utilized in Korea which was responsible for a large decrease in the 
number of CSF cases [140]. In 1996, the country launched an effort to eradicate CSFV. The CSF 
eradication campaign consisted of three stages. The goal of the first stage was to decrease the number of 
outbreaks, and the approach was to increase vaccine usage and culling of infected animals [74]. The 
second stage included mandatory vaccination and testing. In the third and final stage, vaccination would 
be prohibited as the country would move to CSF free status. The campaign was successful as the number 
of CSF outbreaks decreased until no cases were reported in 2000 and 2001. On December 1, 2001, CSF 
vaccination was prohibited and the OIE was notified as South Korea declared CSF-free status [74]. 
 
Korea’s success was short lived, however. In April 2002, two CSF outbreaks were reported with several 
more cases to follow later in the year [74]. In December 2002, the use of emergency CSF vaccination was 
utilized in areas surrounding the outbreaks while stamping-out was also conducted in the infected areas. 
While the outbreaks appeared contained, 65 new CSF outbreaks again occurred in March and May 2003 
[74]. A majority of these outbreaks were connected to the purchase of young breeding animals from a 
farm involved in the December 2002 outbreaks. Korea decided at that time to once again resume a 
national vaccination policy [74]. 
13.9 Romania 
From 1974 to 2001, CSF vaccination with LAV vaccines in Romania was mandatory. During this time, 
only one CSF outbreak occurred in Romania,  diagnosed in 2001 [141]. Starting January 1, 2002, 
vaccination against CSF was no longer allowed in western Romania. Following this ruling, the first CSF 
outbreak occurred in March 2002. During 2002, 38 cases were diagnosed [141]. Then over the next two 
years, the number of CSF cases remained fairly steady with 155 in 2003, and 182 in 2004. However, in 
2005 and 2006 the number of CSF cases increased greatly with 1072 and 1393 cases respectively [141]. 
 
In December 2006, Romania received approval to reinstate emergency vaccination against CSF with the 
goal of CSF eradication [10]. During 2007 and 2008, the vaccination program included vaccination of 
domestic pigs in noncommercial holdings with LAV vaccine by injection and wild boar using baits, while 
a marker vaccine would be utilized by commercial pig herds [142]. The vaccination program was viewed 
as successful as virus spread and clinical signs had been reduced and Romania reported no CSF outbreaks 
during 2008 [142]. Commission Decision 2008/897/EC placed financial limits to the amount of funding 
provided for vaccines for 2009 [143]. Following this decision, changes were made to the 2009 emergency 
vaccination protocol. Pigs in commercial holdings would no longer be vaccinated, while domestic pigs in 
noncommercial holdings would continue to receive the LAV vaccine injections and the wild boar 
population would receive LAV vaccine in baits. A total of 4,098,478 pigs were vaccinated in 
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nonprofessional holdings for CSF in 2009. A total of 252,236 baits were distributed in an attempt to 
vaccinate feral swine and 6862 were recovered because they were not consumed [144]. In 2010, Romania 
stopped vaccination of domestic pigs, but continued to vaccinate wild boars within 20km of other 
countries [142]. 
13.10 United States 
Beginning in the late 1800s and 1900s, swine producers throughout the U.S. utilized a variety of serums 
and vaccines in an attempt to control CSF [1]. As safer vaccines became available in the 1950s, states 
began to prohibit the use of virulent hog cholera virus with 29 states prohibiting its use by June 1959 [1]. 
Eradication of CSFV was authorized on September 6, 1961 [1]. Federal funds began to support the 
program during the summer of 1962, although funding was not always available at the level needed to 
support the program over the years. During the early years of the eradication program, improvements 
were made to diagnostic procedures as well as establishing reporting systems and coordinating 
communications among all states. Each state reported their phase of progress from I to IV. The phases 
were established as follows: Phase I- Preparation; Phase II- Reduction of Incidence; Phase III- 
Elimination of Outbreaks; and Phase IV- Protection Against Reinfection [1]. By January 1, 1975, all 
states reported as Phase IV.  
 
Although hog cholera vaccines were extensively utilized before the eradication program and during its 
early stages, as progress continued with diagnostic procedures and states reporting during the 1960s, the 
use of hog cholera vaccines were beginning to be phased out by 1969 and 1970 [1]. With objections to the 
phase out of CSF vaccine usage, unauthorized use of bovine virus diarrhea vaccine was being reported in 
swine. By 1969, eight states had prohibited the use of all CSF vaccines while 33 states reported 
prohibiting modified live virus CSF vaccines usage only [1]. Vaccine usage was addressed on the national 
level on May 24, 1969 when the USDA prohibited the interstate movement of CSF modified live virus 
vaccine after July 1, 1969 with the goal of eliminating the usage of all CSF vaccines by January 1, 1970. 
 
Feral swine were infected in Florida in 1968 and 1969. Trapping, testing and removal of infected swine 
was successful and vaccine was not used to eliminate CSFV from the feral swine population [1]. 
 
With the elimination of CSF vaccine usage, additional measures were more aggressively utilized to 
eradicate the disease including quarantine and euthanasia of infected animals. Finally, in 1978, the U.S. 
was declared free of CSF [59]. At that time, the cost to eradicate CSF equaled more than $140 million 
dollars, which would total more than $540 million in 1999 [145]. 
14. STRATEGIES FOR VACCINE USE 
Summary 
In an eradication program, animals may be either “vaccinated-to-live” or “vaccinated–to-slaughter.” Both 
types of vaccination are expected to decrease virus transmission and decrease the short-term resources 
needed for carcass disposal, but will require the resources to implement, manage and maintain a 
vaccination, movement and permitting system for the vaccinates. All other factors being equal, 
vaccination-to-live would result in the most benefits for animal survival and domestic continuity of 
business. However, the detrimental effect on exports is likely to be greater. 
 
Approaches to the application of CSF vaccination include prophylactic vaccination, emergency 
vaccination (which may be protective or suppressive), targeted vaccination, ring vaccination, barrier 
vaccination and blanket vaccination. 
 
Because surveillance must be conducted to identify vaccinated animals that become infected, as well as to 
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demonstrate the absence of virus transmission after the outbreak, the vaccination zone should be the 
smallest area necessary to control the outbreak. A variety of animal, virus and environmental factors must 
be considered in establishing an effective vaccination zone. Defining the size and shape of a vaccination 
zone in ring vaccination can be complex. 
 
Consideration should be given to establishing a vaccination surveillance zone around the  
vaccination zone. 
14.1 Vaccination-to-Live and Vaccination-to-Slaughter 
In an eradication program, animals may be either “vaccinated-to-live” or “vaccinated-to-slaughter.” 
Animals that are “vaccinated-to-live” are allowed to live their normal lifespan unless they become 
infected. In contrast, animals that are “vaccinated-to-slaughter” are either slaughtered for human food 
consumption or killed and disposed of by some method. Both types of vaccination decrease the short-term 
resources required for carcass disposal, but will require resources to implement, manage and maintain a 
vaccination, movement and permitting system for the vaccinates. Both types of vaccination are also 
expected to suppress virus transmission. Vaccination-to-live could potentially decrease the number of 
animals that must be culled. All other factors being equal, vaccination-to-live would result in the most 
benefits for animal survival and domestic continuity of business. However, the detrimental effect on 
exports is likely to be greater. According to Article 15.2.4 of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, when a 
non-marker vaccine (e.g. LAV) is used, a country cannot declare CSF-free status until at least 3 months 
after the last case of CSF and after all vaccinated animals are slaughtered, or 12 months after the last case 
and after the last animal was vaccinated. If a marker vaccine is used, countries must wait at least 3 months 
after the last case if vaccinated animals are not slaughtered, or 12 months after the last case if no 
stamping-out policy was used. In reality it could be even longer, regardless of which vaccine is used, as 
use of a vaccination-to-live strategy may mean that vaccinated animals will continue to exist in breeding 
herds for years. [29]. If zones are set up in a country, it is possible that different zones could use a 
different vaccination strategy and have different waiting periods to regain free status. 
14.2 Approaches to the Application of CSF Vaccination 
In 2008, the NVS CSFCWG recommended the U.S. stockpile include CSF LAV vaccine to be used in 
infected and contact herds while the CSF E2 marker vaccines could be utilized in herds around the 
infected and contact herds to make a buffer to help prevent CSFV spread [59]. 
 
While several strategies can be used, EU member countries tend to utilize three different strategies [59]: 
1. LAV CSF vaccines, particularly C strain, are used in endemic areas with feral swine and many 
small operations with backyard producers.  
2. E2 marker vaccination programs are an option during a disease outbreak. 
3. E2 marker vaccines and LAV are used in combination during a disease outbreak. Animals in the 
infected area are vaccinated with LAV vaccine as it provides protection more quickly and E2 
vaccines are used in animals surrounding the area with a possible vaccination-to-live approach. 
 
While E2 marker vaccines have been available in the past, the PORCILIS® PESTI vaccine is temporarily 
off the market due to technical issues. The Bayer vaccine is also not available at this time. However, 
according to the National Veterinary Stockpile Questions and Answers document [89], the NVS contains 
two vaccines. One is a LAV vaccine which can be administered either parenterally or orally. The second 
is a DIVA-compatible E2 antigen-based vaccine, which utilizes killed baculovirus vector technology. 
This vaccine would have to be administered parenterally only. 
 
Under the subheadings below, different vaccination approaches are discussed. The NVS Questions and 
Answers document [89] includes two possible approaches. If the CSF outbreak is focal, using the inner 
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ring vaccination program, the LAV vaccine could be injected into animals with the “vaccinate-to-kill” 
approach. The DIVA vaccine could be used in the outer “vaccinate-to-live” zone. The approach would be 
different if the CSF outbreak were widespread. In a widespread outbreak, the LAV vaccine may be 
administered to terminal market swine, and breeding stock injected with the DIVA vaccine. 
14.2.1 Prophylactic Vaccination 
Prophylactic (routine) vaccination is generally used only in endemic areas or regions at high risk for 
CSFV introduction, because it is a significant trade barrier for countries exporting animal products. LAV 
vaccines are often used.  
14.2.2 Emergency Vaccination 
Emergency vaccination (vaccination in the face of an outbreak) is usually conducted as reactive 
vaccination. In Romania in 2007, Commission Decision no. 2006/802/CE added the plan for emergency 
vaccination for all categories of pigs, in order to eradicate CSFV. During 2007 and 2008, the vaccination 
program included vaccination of domestic pigs in noncommercial holdings with LAV vaccine by 
injection and wild boar using baits, while a marker vaccine would be utilized by commercial pig herds 
[142]. The vaccination program was viewed as successful as virus spread and clinical signs had been 
reduced and Romania reported no CSF outbreaks during 2008 [142].  
14.2.3 Protective Emergency Vaccination 
Protective emergency vaccination, which is conducted among animals in uninfected areas, creates a zone 
of animals with reduced susceptibility around the infected area.  
14.2.4 Suppressive (or “Damping Down”) Emergency Vaccination 
Suppressive (or ‘damping down’) emergency vaccination is conducted in the infected area where the virus 
is already circulating. It is intended to reduce virus transmission, aid control efforts and prevent CSFV 
from spreading beyond the infected zone. Suppressive vaccination is likely to face a more severe virus 
challenge than protective vaccination: Infected animals may already be present on a farm in areas where 
this form of vaccination is used. In contrast, animals in uninfected areas (protective vaccination) are likely 
to be exposed to smaller amounts of virus in aerosols and on fomites.  
14.2.5 Targeted Vaccination 
Targeted vaccination attempts to protect specific groups of animals. Stamping out, as the sole eradication 
strategy, risks the destruction of rare species, rare breeds and high value genetic stock [146]. Targeted 
vaccination may be directed at uninfected animals of high value, which can include livestock with 
particularly valuable, rare or unusual genetic backgrounds, long-lived production animals, zoo animals or 
endangered species. Targeted vaccination can also be directed at uninfected areas where there is a high 
density of susceptible animals. 
14.2.6 Ring Vaccination 
Ring vaccination refers to a strategy of immunizing animals within a defined area around infected 
premises or infected zones. Its purpose is to reduce or prevent virus transmission from a focal outbreak to 
surrounding uninfected areas. Ring vaccination is most likely to be successful if foci of infection can be 
identified rapidly, before the virus can spread. It may not be appropriate in cases where the disease is 
widespread or contained in widely scattered foci, if the disease is difficult to identify, where there is a 
significant delay between infectivity and case confirmation, or where there is a significant delay between 
vaccine administration and the onset of protection. 
 
In addition to stamping out infected herds and issuing a stop movement, immediate vaccination with the 
C-strain vaccine (or another LAV vaccine) may be conducted in a ring around an outbreak [78]. LAV 
vaccines induce a solid herd immunity 1–2 weeks earlier than E2 marker vaccines [78] .The program 
should include observation and surveillance of the vaccinated animals. If the vaccinated animals are not 
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infected with the field CSFV strain, then the pigs can be slaughtered [78]. Whenever a LAV vaccine is 
used, export of pork and pork product restrictions needs to be considered.  
14.2.7 Barrier Vaccination 
Barrier vaccination is very similar in principle to ring vaccination; however, the vaccination zone is used 
to prevent the infection from spreading into the uninfected area from a neighboring country or region into 
the uninfected area, rather than to keep it from spreading outward from infected premises. Geographic 
and political features usually have an important influence on the shape and location of the  
vaccination zone.  
14.2.8 Blanket Vaccination 
Blanket (mass) vaccination can be conducted throughout an entire country or throughout an OIE-defined 
zone with a separate status. Countries are most likely to consider blanket vaccination when a disease 
becomes widespread. This form of vaccination can be carried out indefinitely in countries or zones 
defined as “CSF free with vaccination”; however, this designation affects trade status.  
14.3 Establishing a Vaccination Zone 
The vaccination zone should be the smallest area possible as vaccinated pigs may need to be destroyed in 
order to more quickly prove freedom from CSF [147]. Restrictions may need to be instituted to control 
the use of vaccine as well as pig movement when establishing a vaccination zone [130].  
 
The size of the vaccination zone may vary with the types of vaccines available, the density of domestic 
pigs in the area and if feral swine are present. For example, if the outbreak is in an area of high pig 
density, LAV vaccine may be used around the infected area while depopulation plans are being made 
[59]. The next step may be to vaccinate with E2 marker vaccine in an area around the original vaccination 
zone to act as a buffer.  
 
In the U.S.: 
 The Containment Vaccination Zone is an emergency vaccination zone within the CSF 
Control Area. Vaccination may be performed in the Infected Zone and/or the Buffer Zone.  
 The Protection Vaccination Zone is an emergency vaccination zone outside the Control Area 
in the CSF-Free Area. Barrier vaccination is used in this zone to prevent CSFV from spreading 
into areas free of the virus.  
 
More information on each of these strategies can be found in the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease 
Framework documents. 
15. MODELING STUDIES AND VACCINATION 
Summary 
Models have limitations, but they may provide insights into the possible impacts of vaccination 
approaches in specific scenarios. Some models based on the 1997-98 outbreak in the Netherlands 
examined  control strategies involving ring culling, ring vaccination utilizing various radii of 1 km, 2 km 
and 3km while another applied an economic evaluation. These models suggest that utilizing vaccination 
in a large radius may minimize the duration of the epidemic. 
  
While models provide information as to what may happen during specific scenarios, they do have 
limitations. For example, mathematical models have been applied to assess the use of marker vaccines 
utilizing data from the 1997-1998 CSF outbreak in the Netherlands. 
 
FAD PReP/NAHEMS Guidelines: Appendix B: Vaccination for Classical Swine Fever (2012)               30 
 
Backer et al. [148] utilized mathematical modeling to evaluate vaccination strategies utilizing data from 
the 1997-98 CSF outbreak in the Netherlands. The four control strategies included 1km ring culling, 1 
km, 2 km and 3 km ring vaccination utilizing marker vaccine. The results indicated that 1 km ring culling 
had better results than 1 km vaccination while the 2 km and 3 km ring vaccination were more effective 
than culling or 1 km vaccination, or both at limiting the size and duration of the outbreaks [148]. The 
results may vary if U.S. data were utilized in the model as the size of U.S. operations and the densities 
differ from those in the Netherlands, however, the U.S. data also varies by region.  
 
In 2009, Backer et al. [149] published a multilevel approach utilizing a large number of transmission 
experiments to parameterize the effect of vaccination on transmission between animals. Using the 2006 
Dutch pig farming structure, the five control strategies compared included the EU required 
implementation of restriction zones and transport regulations, culling of detected infected herds and 
contact tracing (EU Council Directive 2001/89/EC); one preemptive ring culling strategy (in rings  
of 1 km radius around detected outbreaks); and three ring vaccination strategies (in rings of 1, 2 and 5 km 
radius) [149]. Findings indicated that a ring vaccination 2 km radius around an infected premises is as 
effective as ring culling in a 1 km radius [149]. 
 
The simulation results of the Backer et al. 2009 [149] study were utilized by Bergevoet et al. to devise an 
economic evaluation of the control strategies. Bergevoet et al. [150] developed a mathematical model 
describing the effects of marker vaccination and transmission of CSF virus between individual animals, 
pens and farms in the Netherlands [150].  
 
While Bergevoet et al. [150] concluded that emergency vaccination can be an effective strategy when 
compared to pre-emptive culling to control CSF epidemics when a larger vaccination radius is used, 
Bergevoet pointed out that small outbreaks may occur more frequently on vaccinated farms. Therefore, 
frequency and type of diagnostics utilized need to be determined with this in mind.  
 
Information from the Bergevoet et al. [150] and Backer et al. [149] studies suggest that utilizing 
vaccination in a large radius may minimize the duration of the epidemic. Vaccination would address 
animal welfare concerns which arise when culling larger numbers of animals and would benefit the 
industry from an economic standpoint as vaccination would help reduce the duration of the outbreak. 
However, depending on the number of animals within the proposed area of ring vaccination, the number 
of vaccine doses available may be a limiting factor.  
 
Paarlberg et al. [7] investigated two possible outcomes if the U.S. swine herd were infected with CSF. In 
this model, 11 million pigs are destroyed, export of live animals is halted, and domestic consumption falls 
by 1%. In the first scenario, grower/finisher pigs are more heavily affected whereas in the second 
scenario, the breeding herd is infected. Estimated losses range from $2.6 to $4.1 billion. This model did 
not include the use of vaccine as a tool to control the CSF outbreak. 
 
In 2008, CSFCWG used another model, the quantitative Kemper-Trego (KT) decision model, to evaluate 
available vaccines and diagnostics [59]. The vaccine ideally needs to prevent transmission, be efficacious 
in all ages of animals, provide immunity for one year, prove safe in all pigs to be vaccinated, one dose 
administration, to be able to manufacture quickly to be able to provide when needed, possess an 
expiration date of at least 24 months, protect pigs in seven days or less, have an accompanying DIVA test, 
have a short withdrawal period and have a reasonable price [59]. Through this analysis, CSFCWG 
determined that while the commercially available CSF vaccines are safe and efficacious, they do need to 
be improved. When using serology, pigs vaccinated with LAV cannot be differentiated from animals 
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infected with CSFV. Commercial recombinant marker vaccines, which are currently unavailable, do not 
induce protection earlier than 15 days post-vaccination [59]. 
16. MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS AND VACCINATION 
Movement restrictions may be utilized in combination with vaccination to limit the spread of CSFV. 
However, the use of vaccination without movement restrictions may be less beneficial unless the infection 
is already extensive. 
 
Although vaccination was not utilized during the 1997-98 CSF outbreak in the Netherlands, animals were 
not allowed to be transported within a 10km radius of the infected farm [8]. Empty animal transporters 
were not even allowed movement within this zone. After a testing period of 7 days to determine CSF 
infection within the zone, the transport ban was limited to the movement of pigs and pig manure [8]. The 
extent of the transport ban would change depending on the number of infections occurring outside of the 
initial zone of infection. 
 
In Mexico in the 1990s, pigs and pork products were not allowed movement from the endemic control 
area where CSF vaccine was mandatory into either the eradication area in which CSF had been eliminated 
and vaccine use was prohibited or the areas free of CSF [134]. However, in Mexico this was difficult to 
enforce as low market prices in the control areas encouraged smuggling live animals into the eradication 
area. Vaccine was utilized in the control areas in Mexico; however, if vaccine was not administered 
correctly, these pigs could have served as a source of infection in the eradication area. Biosecurity is still 
a very important component to any CSF vaccine program. Even with CSF vaccine usage, CSF has spread 
when good biosecurity practices were not followed [134]. 
17. VACCINE SELECTION 
In 2008, the NVS CSFCWG recommended the CSF LAV Strain C vaccine and the CSF E2 marker 
vaccine ( Merck Intervet) to be the vaccines stockpiled while the long term goal is to develop second 
generation CSF vaccine that has the efficacy of CSF LAV vaccine strains with validated DIVA 
capabilities [59]. 
18. VACCINE ADMINISTRATION 
LAV vaccines may be administered either orally or by injection. When administering to domestic pigs, 
the vaccine is given by injection whereas feral swine are administered vaccine through the use of baits. 
Injection is the only route to administer E2 marker vaccines. 
 
When vaccines are administered to domestic pigs, many times animals are crowded to a tight pen and the 
vaccine is administered without individual animal restraint. When this occurs, not all animals may receive 
the correct dose as animals may move while the vaccine is being administered. Training vaccination 
teams would ensure more accurate vaccine administration [151]. 
 
Kaden et al. [76] studied the use of administering oral vaccination to wild boar in baits in field trials from 
1993-1995. Animals initially received 2 doses approximately 14 days apart with booster doses every 6 
months. While the overall rate of uptake of the baits was between 85-100%, less than 50% of the younger 
animals took the baits and became immunized. Rossi et al. [77] concluded that number of baits delivered 
per wild boar neither affected the proportion of immune animals nor the intensity of infection, which 
suggests that increasing the baiting distribution did not increase vaccination effectiveness. 
 
Anytime vaccines are used in a manner that is not in accordance with the approved label directions, 
problems may occur. In Thailand, the C-strain vaccine was used in combination with a live gI-deleted 
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PRV vaccine and administered as a single dose [152]. Pigs were protected against CSF if they were 
immunized with the combination PRV/CSF vaccine; however, they demonstrated a reduced CSF-specific 
cellular immune response compared to those pigs which were vaccinated with the CSF product only. 
More pathological changes following the CSF challenge were also documented in these pigs when 
compared to pigs receiving the CSF vaccine only [152]. 
19. MATERNAL ANTIBODIES 
Maternal antibodies may complicate CSF control during an outbreak. Coggins [153] reported when pigs 
are not exposed themselves to CSFV, maternal antibodies will decline with approximately a 2 week half-
life. Therefore, pigs with a high titer would not clear the antibodies until 12 to 14 weeks of age. Biront et 
al. [38] vaccinated and challenged piglets born from vaccinated and non-vaccinated dams. Virus was 
isolated in piglets with maternal antibodies, vaccinated at two weeks of age and challenged 1 week later. 
However, no virus was isolated in 23 of 25 pigs without maternal antibodies, vaccinated and challenged at 
the same time. While this study by Biront et al. and one conducted by Terpstra [154]both demonstrated 
that pigs with maternal antibodies may survive a CSF infection, Biront et al. suggests that these pigs may 
also shed CSFV for a limited time. The amount of maternal antibody may also affect the vaccination 
response. Vandeputte et al. [155] determined pigs with a higher maternal antibody titer when vaccinated 
had a stronger inhibition than those with a low level of maternal antibodies. Virus was detected for a 
greater length of time in animals vaccinated in the face of high maternal antibody versus their 
unvaccinated counterparts; whereas virus replication was prevented in vaccinated animals with low 
maternal antibody levels [38]. When maternal antibodies are a concern, a general recommendation may 
include delaying the vaccination of young pigs until 6 weeks of age or older [78]. 
 
If immunizing pigs with an E2 marker vaccine, two doses may be needed to protect pigs if they have a 
low level of maternal antibodies. In Thailand, Damrongwatanapokin et al. [156] vaccinated pigs with a 
low level of maternal antibody using E2 marker vaccine. Following CSF challenge 14 days post 
vaccination, the pigs developed clinical signs of CSF infection and all died within 18 days  
post inoculation.  
20. LIMITATIONS OF VACCINATION 
Optimal protection of each individual animal is not usually possible during mass vaccination [157]. The 
level of immunity in each animal will be influenced by vaccine factors including effectiveness of vaccine 
administration (e.g., the maintenance of an effective cold chain and proper administration) and the 
animal’s immune state such as the influence of maternal antibodies or immunosuppression (parasitism, 
poor nutrition, stress, etc.). Animals may also be exposed to the field strain before they have time to 
develop protective immunity. 
20.1 Monitoring for Vaccination Coverage and Efficacy 
Different diagnostic tests can be utilized depending on when the test is to be performed in relation to 
when the animal was vaccinated. For example, PCR would be most reliable in testing vaccine coverage if 
blood is tested within 14 days after MLV administration and tonsil tested within 42 days [111].  
21. IDENTIFICATION OF VACCINATED ANIMALS 
Vaccinated animals need to be permanently identified. Countries vary with how they identify animals. 
Recommendations in Australia included that all animals should be permanently identified in case a 
vaccination-to-kill policy is adopted in which all vaccinated animals would be destroyed [147]. In the 
Netherlands when use of the CSF vaccine was mandatory, animals were identified by ear tags [78]. 
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In the U.S., many forms of identification are utilized for permanent identification such as ear tattoos and 
ear notches or semi-permanent ear tags. Which form would be utilized has not been determined. In the 
case of an introduction of foot and mouth disease, vaccinated animals must be permanently identified, 
using an official North American Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank pink metal ear tag with  
individual identification.  
22. LOGISTICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DECISION 
TO VACCINATE 
Summary 
The technical feasibility of vaccination and funding for a vaccination campaign should be assessed before 
deciding to vaccinate. The assessment should include the availability of sufficient supplies of an effective 
and safe vaccine; the availability of DIVA tests (if applicable); the logistics of vaccine administration; 
and the resources needed for associated activities including individual animal identification, traceability, 
movement permitting and serosurveillance to prove freedom from disease. The swine density in the area 
of the outbreak will influence the use of vaccination. For example, a large number of vaccine doses would 
be needed if ring vaccination were to occur in a swine dense area. 
 
With over 625,000 swine in trucks on the road each day, CSFV has the potential to be transmitted over 
several sites. A large number of sites affected will influence the decision whether or not to utilize  
CSF vaccine. 
 
Disease transmission can be more difficult to control during the cold winter months as disinfecting 
vehicles, trucks and other fomites can be challenging. Vaccine may be needed to help reduce infectious 
dose even though strict biosecurity still needs to be attempted. 
 
Feral swine are increasing in numbers across the U.S. The potential contact between feral and domestic 
swine endangers the health of the domestic herd. If feral swine become infected with CSFV, oral 
vaccination with a LAV vaccine may be beneficial.  
 
The pros and cons of vaccination compared to pre-emptive culling should be considered. Considerations 
include the effects on trade and exports, market shocks, potential restrictions on marketing products from 
vaccinated animals, the types of stakeholders affected (e.g., small-scale operators with limited safety nets 
vs. large-scale operators), the extent of the outbreak and other factors such as the disruption of tourism or 
impacts on local economies. 
 
Consideration should be given to whether genetically irreplaceable stock, endangered species or other 
unusually valuable animals can be successfully protected with biosecurity measures, and whether 
vaccination would be beneficial. Their degree of isolation from livestock should be part of this analysis. 
 
Countries that eradicate CSFV by stamping out, without using vaccination, can declare to be CSF-free 3 
months after the last case. If vaccination-to-kill is part of the eradication campaign, the country must wait 
until 3 months after all vaccinated animals have been slaughtered. If a vaccine is used in which infected 
animals can be distinguished from vaccinated animals and the test to be used is validated by OIE 
standards, the country again must wait until 3 months after the last case. If a country choses to use 
vaccine in which vaccinated animals cannot be distinguished from infected animals, the country must 
wait 12 months after the last vaccination as long as no outbreaks are also reported during those  
12 months. 
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22.1 Technical Feasibility of Vaccination 
To conduct an effective vaccination campaign, an effective and safe vaccine must be available, and the 
vaccine supply (and DIVA testing, if utilized) must be sufficient to carry out the vaccination strategy in a 
timely manner. The vaccine and vaccination strategy should be expected to provide immunity quickly 
enough to stop or reduce virus transmission [12]. Consideration should also be given to whether animals 
would need to be vaccinated more than once (depending if LAV or E2 marker vaccine are utilized), and 
whether the duration of immunity from the vaccine is acceptable. If animals are infected in a swine dense 
area, are sufficient number of vaccination teams available to actually administer the vaccine and could 
this be done following biosecurity guidelines so as not to spread CSFV? Do laboratories have enough 
diagnostic capacity to perform DIVA testing if a marker vaccine is utilized [12]? Slaughter and disposal 
capacity also needs to be considered if a vaccination-slaughter program is implemented. Additional 
resources also need to be considered for associated activities including individual animal identification, 
traceability and movement permitting. 
22.2 Epidemiological Considerations 
Extreme weather conditions may play a role both in disease transmission and disease response efforts. 
During the 1997-1998 CSF outbreak in the Netherlands, transportation vehicles were believed to play a 
role in virus transmission as approximately 39 farms were believed to be infected before measures were 
taken to eliminate CSFV [51]. The outbreak occurred during the winter months at a time when the 
extreme cold may have affected people’s ability to properly clean and disinfect the transport vehicles 
[51]. This possible breech in biosecurity could be a problem in the northern U.S., also, facilitating CSFV 
transmission during response efforts. Controlling disease spread while officials or vaccination teams leave 
a CSF positive site could pose a problem during the winter months.  
 
The distance animals are transported can play a role in disease spread. In Europe, the introduction of a 
single common market has led to an increase in the distance pigs are transported [31]. This increased 
transportation distance in Europe can be correlated with the increase in the number of pigs currently 
moved daily in the U.S as well as the distance they are transported. Hundreds of thousands of pigs are 
being moved daily in the U.S. Conservative industry estimates place over 625,000 swine in trucks on the 
road each day [2]. Transportation could facilitate disease spread within the U.S. The distance animals are 
transported may influence the numbers of animals to receive the CSF vaccine. 
 
The U.S. has many swine dense areas. If a herd or herds in one of these areas becomes infected with 
CSFV, a vaccination zone may include a large number of animals. The number of vaccine doses needed 
to vaccinate all the animals within the zone may itself be a limiting factor. Density of pig herds may be an 
important predictor of area spread. When analyzing the 1997-98 outbreak in the Netherlands, Benard et 
al. [158] determined a positive association between higher pig densities and local spread concerning 
disease transmission. This is important when preemptive slaughter is utilized to decrease pig densities and 
therefore, local spread. 
 
The increased number of feral swine in many parts of the U.S. presents a disease threat to domestic swine. 
Contact between domestic and feral swine needs to be prevented. Feral swine have infected domestic 
swine in Germany [36] and Italy [159]. When CSFV has infected feral swine, oral immunization by using 
baits has been carried out during spring, summer and autumn [160]. During each season, baits are 
distributed twice at four week intervals [160]. Appropriate bait location and banning hunting of feral 
swine both need to be addressed if a vaccination program is to be successful in feral swine [160]. 
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Other diseases circulating in the swine herd may influence the success of a CSF vaccination program. 
Suradhat [116] demonstrated when CSFV vaccinated pigs are co-infected with PRV then challenged with 
CSFV, fatal CSFV infection has resulted. In the United States, PRRSv has impacted production and could 
interfere with CSFV in our domestic swine. Suradhat et al. [116] investigated the possible interference of 
PRRSv with CSF vaccination and demonstrated when pigs are infected with PRRSv prior to vaccination 
with C-Strain vaccine, PRRSv infection may cause CSF vaccine failure.  
22.3 Economic Viability of Vaccination  
Economic viability plays an important role in the decision to vaccinate. There must be sufficient funding 
for the purchase of the vaccine, vaccine delivery and administration, and individual animal identification. 
In addition, funding must be provided for follow on traceability of the vaccinated animals and 
serosurveillance to prove freedom from disease. 
 
The direct costs of vaccination include: 
 Investment costs – e.g., vaccine development, vaccine availability and vaccine delivery 
infrastructure [161] 
 Variable or recurrent costs including the cost of vaccines and delivery [161] 
 Costs to identify vaccinated animals, permit their movement, and conduct serosurveillance to 
prove freedom from disease (in a vaccinate-to-live strategy) 
 
There may also be some indirect costs from vaccination such as lost productivity caused by stress to 
animals, disruptions of agricultural routines, and adverse reactions to the vaccine [161]. 
 
The pros and cons of vaccination compared to pre-emptive culling should be considered. Culling herds 
that were never infected can cause economic losses without necessarily affecting disease spread. 
However, blanket vaccination or inappropriately targeted vaccination is expensive, and there is an 
increased risk that infected animals will not be detected because clinical signs may be suppressed [162]. 
 
The overall impact of vaccination on international trade in livestock products, including longer term 
impacts on trade, is an important consideration for CSF. Vaccination is expected to be most beneficial 
when the outbreak ends sooner, or when vaccination allows the most stringent disease control measures to 
be carried out in a limited area [161]. It is also expected to be beneficial if it impacts a livestock sector in 
an area where there will be a limited effect on exports (e.g., zoning will be possible/practical). If the 
outbreak can be stopped with rapid culling, there is likely to be short-term distress but little long-term 
effect on livelihoods, especially if indemnity can be provided [161]. However, if culling is more 
widespread or the disease is out of control, vaccination may save livelihoods [161]. 
 
Vaccination is likely to be beneficial to livelihoods when it can: 
 Provide effective disease control with little depopulation, especially if indemnity is not 
available for culled animals [161] 
 Prevent national markets from being disrupted or rapidly restore them [161] 
 Minimize other economically important factors such as the disruption of tourism or impacts  
on local economies [161] 
 Reduce the time export markets are lost 
 
Vaccination may be particularly beneficial to small-scale operators whose safety nets are limited [161]. If 
stamping-out is used, it is possible for culling to have a minimal effect on the national economy while 
having a significant effect on the livelihoods of the people who are directly affected, especially 
smallholders and small-scale traders who depend on regular cash flow from agriculture. Although 
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indemnity may be available for animals that must be destroyed, it rarely covers the cost of lost 
production, time and cash flow [161]. The emotional impact of the destruction of apparently healthy 
animals should also be taken into consideration [161]. In the U.S., diseases have been controlled 
effectively in the past by culling infected and exposed animals, but there have been changes in 
agricultural practices, such as increased herd sizes, which may make the impact greater [93]. 
 
Consideration of market shocks should be part of the economic analysis. Market shocks can result from 
loss of consumer confidence (decreased demand), very severe culling or the closing of markets [161]. 
Unless consumers can be persuaded that products from vaccinated animals are safe, there may still be 
market shocks from consumer fear even if the disease itself is controlled by vaccination. Consideration 
should be given to whether meat and other products from vaccinated animals can be used, and whether 
they will need to be treated (because vaccination might mask the presence of virus) before they are 
allowed into markets. If export markets are affected by vaccination, domestic markets can be affected, 
because animal products that were once exported may be sold within the country, lowering prices [161] 
Producers for domestic markets can also be affected by quarantines. If animals are larger than normal 
weight and/or are released into the market in a short period after quarantine is lifted, prices may be lower 
[161]. The cost of keeping and feeding animals through the quarantine period should also be taken  
into consideration. 
 
During modeling of the 1997-1998 outbreak in the Netherlands, the epidemiological and economic 
calculations show that - if vaccination is chosen - vaccination within a radius of 2 to 5km is preferred to 
vaccination within a radius of 1km [150]. 
22.4 Vaccination of Genetically Irreplaceable Stock, Endangered Species or 
Other Unusually Valuable Animals 
Consideration should be given to whether these animals can be successfully protected with biosecurity 
measures, and whether vaccination would be beneficial. Their degree of isolation from livestock should 
be part of this analysis. 
22.5 Effect of Vaccination on Regaining OIE CSF-Free Status 
According to the OIE, countries that eradicate CSFV by stamping-out, without using vaccination, can 
declare CSF-free status 3 months after the last case [29]. If vaccination-to-kill is part of the eradication 
campaign, the country must wait until 3 months after all vaccinated animals have been slaughtered. If a 
vaccine is used in which infected animals can be distinguished from vaccinated animals and the test to be 
used is validated by OIE standards, the country again must wait until 3 months after the last case. If a 
country choses to use vaccine in which vaccinated animals cannot be distinguished from infected animals, 
the country must wait 12 months after the last vaccination as long as no outbreaks are also reported during 
those 12 months. 
 
In 1996, Korea implemented a three stage CSF eradication program. While vaccination was a part of the 
program initially, CSF vaccination was prohibited during the final stage. Finally, on December 1, 2001, 
their CSF-free status was declared; although it was short lived as Korea re-broke with CSF in April  
2002 [74].  
 
CSF eradication programs may include the use of CSF vaccination for domestic swine, feral swine or 
both domestic and feral. Of course, the use of CSF vaccine in either of these populations will affect 
regaining OIE CSF-Free status. For example in 2010, Romania stopped vaccination of domestic pigs, but 
continued to vaccinate wild boars within 20km of other countries; therefore, with the use of CSF vaccine 
in feral pigs, Romania could not declare CSF-free status. 
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23. VACCINATION IN ZOOS AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS 
According to Article 5 of European Directive 2001/89/EC [9], in the European Union, if a CSF outbreak 
affects pigs kept for scientific purposes or if they are a rare breed in a laboratory, zoo, wildlife park or 
fenced area, officials may be exempt from killing these infected animals. Officials could also include 
these animals in an emergency vaccination plan request to the European Commission asking that these 
animals be vaccinated during an outbreak. 
24. PUBLIC ACCEPTABILITY OF VACCINATION AS A COMPONENT OF  
CSF ERADICATION 
Summary 
Vaccines improve animal welfare or well-being as well as protecting animal health. Vaccines can be used 
to help improve animal welfare and productivity for the benefit of the producer as well as food safety and 
food security for the consumer. Attitudes toward CSF vaccination among the general public may be 
influenced by attitudes toward mass culling and animal welfare concerns, as well as by the acceptability 
of meat from CSF-vaccinated animals in markets. The public may be less likely to accept withholding 
CSF vaccine over concern of trade implications. 
 
Classical swine fever virus poses no known risk of human infection for personnel handling the agent, 
handling infected animals, or carrying out diagnostic tests. 
 
Vaccines are used regularly in livestock without adverse effects on human health. The CSF virus is highly 
species specific and under natural conditions it is capable of infecting only domestic pigs and wild boar. 
 
Procedures have been established to inactivate CSFV in pork and pork products. 
 
In a survey conducted in all EU countries, on the public perception of risk and particularly on food safety 
found that people were most concerned about factors such as pesticide residues, new viruses, bacterial 
contamination and unhygienic conditions outside the home. The report did not specifically address 
vaccination, but it suggests that consumers have a wide variety of concerns about food. Measures have 
been recommended to help minimize consumer concerns regarding food from animals vaccinated during 
an emergency. 
 
In general, the use of vaccines improves animal and human health by preventing or controlling disease 
outbreaks. While some parents disagree with this statement, a majority of the public would agree that 
vaccinations are necessary as they take their children for routine vaccinations or they themselves receive 
the annual influenza vaccination. So, it would stand to reason that from a health standpoint, a majority of 
the public would understand that the use of vaccinations in the face of a disease outbreak would provide a 
great benefit. 
 
One benefit, however, that sometimes is not recognized is when the use of vaccines improves animal 
welfare or well-being. When animals are in poor health, suffering from a disease that would have been 
prevented by vaccination, the welfare of the animals is a concern. Vaccines can be used to help improve 
animal welfare and productivity for the benefit of the producer as well as food safety and food security for 
the consumer [163]. Attitudes toward CSF vaccination among the general public may be influenced by 
attitudes on mass culling and animal welfare concerns, as well as by the acceptability of meat from CSF-
vaccinated animals in markets. The public may be less likely to accept withholding CSF vaccine over 
concern of trade implications [164]. There has been intense public criticism when large numbers of 
apparently healthy animals were culled during some outbreaks, including the 2001 epizootics in the U.K.  
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and the Netherlands. In the 1997-1998 CSF outbreak in the Netherlands, over 7 million head of weaned 
and slaughter weight pigs were killed for welfare reasons while over 2 million young pigs between 3 to 17 
days of age were euthanized by lethal injection to ease the stress on the rendering system [8]. 
 
A survey was conducted in 2004 including member states of the European Union [165]. The goal of the 
survey was to better understand the view of those involved in the control strategies in countries having 
experienced outbreaks from FMD, CSF and avian influenza. During the outbreaks, members of the EU 
followed EU Directive 2001/89/EC in which vaccination is prohibited unless an emergency vaccination 
plan is submitted to and approved by the European Commission. Therefore, the control strategies utilized 
were mainly to quarantine infected herds, stop movement of animals in the area, and cull infected and 
suspect herds. According to Cohen et al. [165], the effect of stamping-out greatly affected people directly 
involved. Owners and workers described clinical signs relating to post-traumatic stress syndrome and 
experienced severe stress with a loss of self-esteem, a loss of self-confidence, and a significant  
economic loss. 
 
A survey was conducted in the Netherlands to determine how the meat from vaccinated animals would be 
viewed by the consumer. How the product was presented played a large role in the mindset of the 
consumer. For example, even when meat was identified as coming from vaccinated animals, it was 
favored when described as 'exclusive', 'animal-friendly' and 'environmentally-friendly'. However, meat 
from vaccinated animals did not perform as well due to concerns of flavor, convenience and quality. On 
the basis of this consumer survey, in the Netherlands it can be concluded that, consumers may continue to 
purchase meat from vaccinated animals depending on how it is presented to them [150]. 
24.1 Classical Swine Fever Disease as a Zoonosis 
Classical swine fever virus poses no known risk of human infection for personnel handling the agent, 
handling infected animals, or carrying out diagnostic tests [47]. Accordingly, it has a low categorization 
in health and safety regulations [47]. 
24.2 The Use of Meat from Vaccinated and/or Potentially Infected Animals 
Vaccines are used regularly in livestock without adverse effects on human health. The CSF virus is 
species specific and under natural conditions it is capable of infecting only domestic pigs and wild boar 
[166]. There is no evidence that it is capable of infecting humans. During the CSF outbreak in the U.K. in 
2000, the U.K. Food Standards Agency stated that there were not any food safety implications in their 
current outbreak [166]. 
 
If an individual animal tests negative with rRT-PCR in blood, it can be excluded as source of infectious 
fresh meat for a short period of time. Animals may register negative in the very early stages of infection 
or they may contract infection right after testing. When an animal is vaccinated with MLV then infected 
at least four days post vaccination, the risk of that carcass carrying infectious CSFV is very low [111]. 
Animals that are correctly vaccinated and test negative using rRT-PCR after time has passed for an 
immune response to develop are unlikely to have their fresh meat test positive at slaughter [111]. 
 
Modeling indicates an eradication strategy applying correct vaccine usage and compliance may lower the  
risk of infectious CSFV in fresh meat when compared to the conventional strategy of pre-emptive  
culling [111]. 
24.3 Procedures to Inactivate CSFV in Animal Products 
In pork and pork products, CSFV survival varies depending how the product is stored and on the 
treatments used on processed meat [47]. CSFV survives the longest in frozen pork in which survival times 
of more than 4 years have been recorded [45, 47]. In chilled fresh pork, CSFV has survived up to 85 days 
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[42-44, 47]. While little information is available on the survival of CSFV in pork stored at room 
temperature, artificially contaminated factory- processed abattoir waste held at 20
o
C for 3 weeks was 
inactivated within four days [47, 167]. 
 
Due to the varying survival times of CSFV in product, inactivation of CSFV needs to be accomplished by 
the OIE recommended methods. According to Article 15.2.21 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 
[29], inactivation of CSFV in meat should be accomplished through the following: 
 Heat treatment: Should occur with a F0 value of 3.00 or greater in a hermetically sealed 
container; or at a temperature of 70°C or greater in the meat. F is the time needed to inactivate 
a given organism (in this case, CSFV) at a given temperature. It is a designation of the thermal 
death time. 
 Natural fermentation and maturation: Treatment used should include either an available water 
(aw) value of not more than 0.93, or a pH value of not more than 6.0. Natural fermentation and 
maturation of hams should last at least 190 days and 140 days for loins. 
 Dry cured pork meat:  Bone-in Italian style hams should be cured with salt and dried for at 
least 313 days, and bone-in Spanish style pork meat for at least 252 days for Iberian hams, 140 
days for Iberian shoulders, 126 days for Iberian loin, and 140 days for Serrano hams [29, 168]. 
 
Procedures have also been established for the inactivation of the CSF virus in skins and trophies [29]. 
24.4 Procedures for Marketing Animal Products After Emergency Vaccination 
In general, there are increasing concerns among consumers about food safety and purity, and the 
understanding of the real risks in specific situations may be weak [169]. In 2005, the EU Directorate-
General for Health and Consumer Protection and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
commissioned a survey, conducted in all EU countries, on the public perception of risk and particularly 
on food safety ([170] reviewed in [169]). This study found that people were most concerned about factors 
such as pesticide residues, new viruses, bacterial contamination and unhygienic conditions outside the 
home. There were also concerns about animal welfare, genetically modified organisms, environmental 
pollutants, food additives and other issues. The report did not specifically address vaccination, but it 
suggests that consumers have a wide variety of concerns about food, with the most concern directed 
toward issues that are not under the person’s control. 
 
Measures that could be taken to minimize consumer concerns regarding the rejection of food from 
animals vaccinated during an emergency [169]: 
 Develop a vaccination policy before an outbreak, and determine the conditions under which it 
would be used. 
 Discuss the vaccination policy with all stakeholders. Remind stakeholders that vaccines are 
used routinely in livestock and poultry for endemic diseases. 
 Obtain the support of the public for vaccination and other control policies. 
 License vaccines before they will be needed. If a conditional license must be given to an 
emergency vaccine, consider its effect on consumer concerns. Provide safety information to all 
stakeholders about the use of such vaccines. 
 Do not separately label products from animals vaccinated for CSF. 
 Give unequivocal and authoritative assurance that vaccinated products are safe to eat. This 
should include statements from national and international independent bodies that  
consumers respect. 
 Begin communication about CSF vaccines before an outbreak and continue to communicate 
during the outbreak. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Adjuvant 
A substance added to vaccines to enhance the capacity to stimulate the production of antibodies or cell-
mediated immune responses. 
Animal Product 
Blood or any of its components, bones, bristles, feathers, flesh, offal, skins, and any by product containing 
any of those components that originated from an animal or bird. 
Biosecurity 
A series of management practices designed to prevent the introduction of disease agents onto or prevents 
the spread from an animal production facility.  
Buffer Zone 
Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises. 
Cerebellar Hypoplasia 
Underdevelopment of cerebellum, the region of the brain that has an important role in motor control. 
Cold Chain 
The system used to ensure that vaccines stay within an appropriate temperature range from manufacturer 
to the point of administration. 
Containment Vaccination Zone 
Emergency Vaccination Zone within the Control Area. This may be a secondary zone designation. 
Control Area  
Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone. 
Cull 
To voluntarily remove from the herd and sell to a slaughter facility. Sometimes referred to as  
“market” cattle. 
Detection of Infection in Vaccinated Animals (DIVA) 
A type of vaccine that is marketed with a companion diagnostic kit to detect infection of a natural 
pathogen in animals vaccinated against that disease. 
Ear Tags 
Tags, usually plastic, put in animals’ ears to identify them. Every producer uses their own numbering 
system. They can easily be removed. 
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Efficacy 
Specific ability or capacity of the biological product to effect the result for which it is offered when used 
under the conditions recommended by the manufacturer. 
Endemic 
Present in a population or geographical area at all times. 
Epidemic 
An (often suddenly) increased number of cases over a broad geographic area. 
Euthanasia 
Deliberate ending of an animal’s life in a manner that causes minimal pain and distress. 
Fomite 
An inanimate object or material on which disease-producing agents may be conveyed (e.g. feces,  
bedding, clothes). 
Free Area 
Area not included in any Control Area. 
Incubation Period 
The period of time between infection and the development of clinical signs. 
Infected Premises 
Premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, 
compatible clinical signs, case definition, and international standards. 
Infected Zone 
Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises. 
Live Attenuated Vaccines (Modified Live Vaccines) 
Vaccines that replicate themselves in the host but should produce no or only very mild clinical signs. 
They induce the animal to mount an immune response that will provide protection from severe disease by 
the natural pathogen.  
Mortality 
Death of an animal; dead animals can be referred to as mortalities. 
National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) 
Established by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 and operational in 2006. Able to deploy large 
quantities of veterinary resources anywhere in the continental U.S. within 24 hours. 
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Outbreak 
An increased number of cases (above what is expected) from a limited geographic area. 
Potency 
Relative strength of a biological product as determined by test methods or procedures as established by 
APHIS in Standard Requirements or in the approved Outline of Production for such product. 
Prophylactic Vaccination 
Taking measures to prevent disease via administration of vaccination. 
Protection Vaccination Zone 
Emergency Vaccination Zone outside the Control Area. This may be a secondary zone designation. 
Purity 
Quality of a biological product prepared to a final form relatively free of extraneous microorganisms and 
extraneous material (organic or inorganic) as determined by test methods or procedures established by 
APHIS in Standard Requirements or in the approved Outline of Production for such product, but free of 
extraneous microorganisms or material which in the opinion of the Administrator adversely affects the 
safety, potency, or efficacy of such product. 
Quarantine 
To place animals in strict isolation to prevent the spread of disease.  
Rendering 
A process of converting animal carcasses into a stable product that can be used for other purposes.  
Reservoir 
The environment in which a pathogen lives, grows, and multiplies. Can include humans, animals, and the 
physical environment. The reservoir is often, but not always, the source of infection. 
Risk (Risk Pertaining to Infection) 
The probability of becoming infected given that exposure to an infectious agent has occurred. 
Sensitivity 
The proportion of true positives that are detected by a diagnostic test. 
Sentinel 
A susceptible population, farm, or animal that is repeatedly sampled in order to assess health status over 
time; the ‘sentinel’ must be representative of the at-risk populations, farms, or animals.  
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Stamping-out 
The killing of the animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected in the herd and, where 
appropriate, those in other herds which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, 
or by indirect contact of a kind likely to cause the transmission of the causal pathogen.  
Suppressive Vaccination 
Emergency vaccination conducted both within and around infected zones. Suppressive vaccination can 
take place throughout a country or compartment; however, this strategy may require large quantities of 
vaccine and sufficient human resources. 
Susceptible Animal 
Any animal that can be infected with and replicate the disease pathogen of concern. 
Targeted Vaccination 
Vaccination of selected animals or populations (e.g., uninfected animals of high value including livestock 
with valuable or unusual genetic backgrounds, long-lived production animals, zoo animals, or endangered 
species). Can also be directed at uninfected areas where there is a high density of susceptible animals. 
Tracing 
Information gathering on recent movements (during a defined time period) of animals, personnel, 
vehicles, and fomites (both to and from affected farms) to identify potential spread of disease to other 
livestock premises and to detect a putative source of infection for the affected farm.  
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
The intergovernmental organization created by the International Agreement of 25 January 1924, signed 
by 28 countries. In April 2011, the OIE totaled 178 Member Countries. OIE standards are recognized by 
the World Trade Organization as reference international sanitary rules. The purpose of the OIE is to 
guarantee the transparency of animal disease status world-wide.  
Zoning 
The practice of defining subpopulations of animals on a geographical basis, using natural, artificial, or 
legal boundaries, for the purpose of disease control (OIE). 
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ACRONYMS 
 
 
AI 
Artificial Insemination 
APHIS 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; an 
agency of USDA 
BVDV 
Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus 
CFR 
Code of Federal Regulations 
CLS 
Chinese Lapinised Strain 
CSFCWG 
Classical Swine Fever Countermeasures 
Working Group 
CSFV 
Classical Swine Fever Virus 
CVB 
Center for Veterinary Biologics; a division  
of APHIS 
DIVA 
Detection of Infection in Vaccinated Animals 
DOI 
Duration of Immunity 
EFSA 
European Food Safety Authority 
ELISA 
Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay 
EU 
European Union 
FAT or FATST 
Fluorescent Antibody Test 
FAVN 
Fluorescent Antibody Virus Neutralization Test 
FMD 
Foot and Mouth Disease 
GPE 
Guinea Pig Cell-Culture-Adapted 
IBC 
Institutional Biosafety Committee 
 
 
 
KT 
Kemper-Trego 
LAV 
Live Attenuated Vaccines 
MAbs 
Monoclonal Antibodies 
MLV 
Modified Live Vaccines 
NEPA 
National Environmental Policy Act 
NPLA 
Neutralizing Peroxidase-Linked Assay 
NVS 
National Veterinary Stockpile 
OIE 
Office International des Epizooties’, currently 
referred to as the World Organization for 
Animal Health 
PCR 
Polymerase Chain Reaction 
PD50 
Protective Dose Fifty 
PID 
Porcine Infectious Dose 
PK 
Pig Kidney 
PRRS 
Porcine Reproductive and  
Respiratory Syndrome 
PRV 
Pseudorabies Virus 
rRT-PCR 
Real time Reverse Transcription Polymerase 
Chain Reaction 
RT-PCR 
Reverse Transcription Polymerase  
Chain Reaction 
USAHA 
United States Animal Health Association 
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USDA 
United States Department of Agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VNTs  
Virus Neutralizing Tests 
